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LETTERS

ON THE

IMPOLICY

OF

A STANDING ARMY,

IN TIME OF PEACE.

AND,

On the unconſtitutional and illegal Meaſure of

BARRACKS;

WITH

A POSTCRIPT,

ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE REAL CONSTITUTIONAL MODE OF DEFENCE FOR THIS ISLAND.

CONTAINING ALSO

A SHORT REVIEW

Of the Effects which are produced by a Standing Army,

On

MORALITY, POPULATION AND LABOUR.

LONDON:

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BRITISH MUSEUM

PREFACE.

THE following Letters, under the ſignature of ALBANICUS, were written on the ſpur of the occaſion, and originally intended only for the courſe of circulation that the public Prints in which they appeared, viz. the MANCHESTER HERALD and LEICESTER CHRONICLE, ſeverally extended to.

The two letters which precede them, the firſt ſigned "A FRIEND TO THE MILITARY," and the other, in anſwer to it, ſigned "A LAWYER," gave riſe to them; and the author had no view in their firſt publication, but that of filling up a few vacant hours, and delivering his ſentiments on ſo intereſting and important a ſubject, in hopes that the obſervations he therein made, and the chain of hiſtorical evidence which he adduced, of the jealouſy of our anceſtors towards *a Standing Army*, as dangerous to the Liberties of the Country, would awaken the ſeemingly ſlumbering attention of his fellow citizens, and induce them in earneſt to take every legal and conſtitutional ſtep towards ridding themſelves of ſo expenſive and ſo unneceſſary a burden.

It has been ſuggeſted to him however, not only by his particular friends, but by the earneſt wiſhes of many who do not know the Author (but which have been conveyed to him by thoſe who do) that he ſhould republiſh them in a Pamphlet; alledging that the circulation of thoſe papers in which they firſt appeared, though very wide, only extends to a ſmall part of the Nation, when compared with the whole; and that as *all* the people in every part of the kingdom are equally affected by the evils which are there pointed out, it is but right that they ſhould be as univerſally made manifeſt as poſſible. Theſe hints have induced the Author to ſubmit his thoughts to the obſervation and judgment of the nation at large; a circumſtance he would have been extremely diffident of doing, had he not been ſo much encouraged by the opinions and judgment of ſeveral gentlemen, who are at this time an ornament to the literary world, and do honour to

their

their country and to human nature, by the philanthropy and patriotiſm of their ſentiments.

This Work was intended to be publiſhed immediately previous to the meeting of Parliament, in the preſent ſeſſion, and was accordingly put to preſs, and very conſiderably advanced in the printing before the ſame took place; ſeveral untoward and unexpected accidents, however, prevented its being ready for publication before the meaſures adopted on both ſides the water proclaimed this Country in a ſtate of hoſtility with France; it therefore becomes neceſſary to requeſt the reader to obſerve, that every thing which is therein mentioned, as ſtating *a Standing Army* to be a *dangerous*, a *grievous*, and an *unneceſſary* burden on the people, entirely relates to, and means *in time of peace, and no other*.

The Author is ſenſible that he ſhall draw on himſelf the obloquy of an hoſt of men, intereſted in keeping up the many iniquitous exiſting abuſes, of which this Country has to complain; but againſt thoſe he has to conſole himſelf with the good wiſhes and favourable opinion of every man who poſſeſſes a true ſenſe of the *amor patriæ*, that inexpreſſible, but delightful ſenſation, which at once expands the heart, nerves and ennobles the mind, and renders both invulnerable to the baſe and ſordid attacks of that baneful influence which ſaps the foundation of every thing which is honourable in man, and bribes him to ſacrifice the cauſe of his country and fellow citizens at the venal ſhrine of ſelf intereſt, by a ſhameful proſtitution of honour, principle, and virtue.

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More deſirous of obtaining the good opinion of his fellow-citizens and countrymen, for the honeſty of his intentions, than for the elegance of his writing, he ſubmits theſe Letters to their conſideration, with the aſſurance, that his only motive in writing them was to place the Inſtitution treated of in its true light; to recal to the minds of the public the jealouſy which our brave and hardy anceſtors always entertained of it; and to awaken their attention to the great weight and importance of a ſubject which ſo intimately and deeply concerns every inhabitant of every *free State* in the world, and particularly thoſe of GREAT BRITAIN.

LETTERS

LETTERS

ON THE

STANDING ARMY.

TO THE PRINTER OF THE MANCHESTER HERALD.

Mr. Printer,

THE ſmall pay, and the ſevere puniſhment of SOLDIERS, render them frequently objects of commiſeration: They are, no doubt, the flower of the community, in perſon as well as in ſpirit; and, if it could be managed, it would certainly be very deſirable to reſtore them to the common privilege of Engliſhmen and Citizens —*the trial by jury.* They certainly deſerve more conſideration than is uſually paid them. The ſtrange proceedings under GRANT's trial, and the ſevere puniſhment to which he was liable, ſuggeſted the following QUERE, which I ſubmit to your legal correſpondents:—

"Can a man be hired for *life*, or for *a num-*
"*ber of years*, to a ſervice which can legally

"con-

" continue only *one* year? It ſeems like being " the ſervant of a non-entity. The ſtanding army " of this country is appointed only from year to " year, and the Mutiny Act is yearly renewed, " otherwiſe I apprehend the army would be diſ- " banded *ipſo facto.* But as the preſent forces " are appointed by Act of Parliament only dur- " ing the term of the exiſting Mutiny Act, and " as nobody can tell whether Parliament may " chuſe to have an army next year, a man can " hardly be enliſted *abſolutely* to a ſervice that is " merely *contingent.* I do not know the method " of enliſting ſoldiers, but if it be merely a ge- " neral hiring, without a ſpecial form ſtating and " providing for the contingence, I ſhould think " (in point of common ſenſe) that ſuch general " hiring or enliſtment is only valid till the expi- " ration of the exiſting Mutiny Act."

I am not competent myſelf to this queſtion, but I hope ſome of your legal correſpondents will agitate it, if there is any doubt concerning it; for although no friend to the people can be a friend to the ſyſtem of a ſtanding army, yet every friend to the people muſt be a friend to the ſoldiers, who form ſo large, and ſo important a part of the people. *May* they always remember that they have rights to claim as citizens, as well as duties to fulfil as ſoldiers.

A FRIEND TO THE MILITARY.

TO THE PRINTER.

Sir,

I Have attentively conſidered the letter of your correſpondent, who ſigns himſelf "A "Friend to the Military," and I ſend you (if you ſhall think it worthy inſertion in your valuable repoſitory of weekly intelligence) an anſwer to the following queſtion put by him:

"*Can a man be hired for* life, *or for* a num-"ber of years, *to a ſervice which can legally con-*"*tinue only* one year?"

The caſe of a ſoldier's contract is in this country the ſame with that of all other citizens; his *enliſting* is called a hiring among the other orders of men, and it depends upon the nature of the agreement. Every man is at liberty to hire himſelf to any particular ſervice for *life*, if he chooſes it; but then the hiring muſt be expreſsly for that term, to give any other perſon claim to his ſervice for ſo long a time; and even in this caſe, there is a contingency on which it depends. For inſtance, a ſoldier may hire, (or to ſpeak in the military phraſe) may enliſt himſelf to ſerve his Majeſty King George III. during his (the ſoldier's) *life*; but if his Majeſty, to

whom he is ſo enliſted, ſhould die before the ſoldier, the latter becomes diſcharged of courſe; becauſe, though he enliſted to ſerve king Geo. III. he did not enliſt under any other king who may ſucceed him. To this it may be anſwered, that it is a maxim in our law that "the king can "never die;" true, if the enliſting be generally to the *king*; but if it be expreſsly to King George the Third, the contract would terminate with his *natural* exiſtence.

In the ſame way the argument holds good *e converſo:* ſuppoſing a man enliſts himſelf to ſerve the *king* for ſeven years, I am of opinion he is clearly and ſtrictly bound to ſerve any king of Great Britain and Ireland during that term, under the ſame kind of implied condition or contingency, viz.---That the parliament during that time ſhall every year paſs the Mutiny Bill, which provides for the maintenance and the *legal* eſtabliſhment of the army. Should the parliament refuſe to paſs ſuch bill, the contract then becomes void by the *law*, to which both the contracting parties, the *king* and the *ſoldier* are ſubſervient, and obliged to ſubmit. In both theſe caſes it is neceſſary to obſerve, that the contract or enliſting muſt be *expreſsly* either for *life*, or for a *term of years*. In all other caſes where the contract

is *general*, viz. to ſerve his Majeſty without any determinate or poſitive time or term, the hiring is undoubtedly, in the eye of the law, but for *one year*, as in all other caſes of a general hiring.

If the ſoldier, at the end of the year, continues in the ſervice without wiſhing or aſking for a *diſcharge*, he then becomes bound to another's ſervice, under the implied preſumption that both parties are deſirous of continuing the contract as originally made; and ſo on from year to year to the end of the ſoldier's life, if he chooſes to continue it ſo long, or is not diſbanded or reduced by his employer. That this is the nature of the contract between the king and his ſoldiers, is moſt evident, from its being in the power of the former, with the conſent of parliament, to diſband the army, or to reduce particular regiments; which, if the hiring were not conſidered as a *general one*, would be the *ſummum* of *injuſtice*. And it is further proved by this circumſtance, viz.---That regiments raiſed in time of war, for ſeven or ten years *certain*, cannot be reduced at the concluſion of that war, if ſuch an event takes place before the end of their time for which they were enliſted, unleſs ſuch regiments *conſent* to ſuch reduction, or to receive an *equivalent* for the remainder of the unexpired term.

Every

Every contract, to be binding on both parties, muſt be *mutual*—ſo much pay for ſo much ſervice; which cannot be the caſe, if in the inſtance I am ſpeaking of, enliſting to ſerve his Majeſty in *general terms*, without mentioning any certain time, or number of years, ſhould be conſtrued an enliſting for life, and, at the ſame time, that his Majeſty ſhould have power to diſband or reduce them whenever he pleaſed. This would be a ſort of contract which our law, founded on reaſon, knows not of, as there would be no reciprocity of intereſt; the advantage would be all on one ſide, and would ſtand thus: "I make a co-"venant with you, entirely at your expence, "and for my benefit; I will obſerve it as far as "my inclination leads me, and you ſhall obſerve "it as far as I pleaſe."

I am therefore clearly of opinion, that every enliſting, which is not for a ſpecified time or *term of years*, is nothing more than a general hiring for *one year*, and may be continued afterwards from year to year, by the conſent, and at the will of the parties, to the end of either of their lives.

A LAWYER.

P. S. As to what your correſpondent ſays about reſtoring ſoldiers to the privilege of *trial by jury*,

jury, it is impoſſible, further than they are now entitled to it: nor have they any hardſhip to complain of in this reſpect: they make their agreements with their eyes open: they know, or ought to know, that they ſubject themſelves to the rigours of military diſcipline when they adopt the profeſſion of arms; and none can be ignorant of what that diſcipline is. If they are, they deſerve to ſmart for it. The next to brutiſh ignorance which pervades *the great body of the people* in this country, has ever been its bane, and it is to be feared will prove its deſtruction as *a free nation*; and though nothing can *excuſe* the *impudence* of *Burke*'s expreſſion, in terming them "the Swiniſh Multitude," Engliſhmen ought to bluſh with *ſhame*, as well as *indignation*, that it ſhould convey even a *ſhadow* of TRUTH.

As to the ſoldiers, the beſt way of "commiſerating their caſe" would be to reduce their number and increaſe their pay.

TO THE PRINTER.

Sir,

I Very much approve the arguments of your correſpondent "A LAWYER" on the ſubject of enliſting ſoldiers, *as far as it goes*. I think

think it candid, cool, and ſenſible. But, ſir, *lawyer like*, he has left the moſt material part of the letter ſigned "A Friend to the Military," ſtill in a doubtful ſtate, and altogether unanſwered. It is true, *one quere* is only ſuggeſted by that letter, and that *quere* terminated by a note of interrogation, is very fully anſwered. The remainder of the letter might perhaps appear to him to be only the reaſoning of a doubtful and undetermined perſon upon the ſubject of diſbanding the army: but if I miſtake not, it is the wiſh of "A Friend to the Military" to have the whole ſubject of his letter inveſtigated. With your permiſſion, therefore, I will ſtate the paragraph, which appears to me very important, and neceſſary to be taken notice of, but which has either wilfully, or by accident, eſcaped the obſervation of "A Lawyer."

"The ſtanding army of this country, ſays 'A Friend to the Military' is appointed only "from year to year, and the Mutiny Act is "yearly renewed, otherwiſe I apprehend the "army would be diſbanded *ipſo facto*. But as "the preſent forces are appointed by act of par-"liament only during the term of the exiſting "mutiny act, and as nobody can tell whether "the parliament may chooſe to have an army

"next

" next year, a man can hardly be enliſted *abſo-*
" *lutely*, to a ſervice that is merely contingent."

The conſideration of this queſtion, view it which way you will, is to an Engliſhman, a very melancholy one: becauſe he ſees in the whole of it a deep and dangerous wound given to the conſtitution, and but very ſmall, or no hopes at all, that ſuch wound will ever be *healed*. Indeed, without *reform in parliament*, I will venture to pronounce deciſively that it *never will*. Aſſertion, you will ſay, is no proof.---True; let us try it then by fair and honeſt inference and deduction.

It is univerſally allowed, that a *ſtanding army* is repugnant to, and incompatible with the intereſts of a free ſtate. It is equally certain that the expence of it is great and grievous to the people, who are obliged to pay it. Seeing then, that former parliaments have had the complaiſance to betray and ſacrifice the rights of their conſtituents, and at an enormous and grievous expence to them, to gratify the executive power with ſuch a formidable maſs of human machinery, entirely at its own diſpoſal, from the time of paſſing the mutiny act, till it expires, what reaſonable ground of hope have we, that any future

parliament, conſtituted as that body *now is*, will not chooſe to have an army next year; *and every year following*. It is ridiculous to ſuppoſe it. "A Lawyer" is therefore right in ſaying, "that "when a man enliſts himſelf to ſerve the king "for life, it is on the implied condition or con- "tingency, that the parliament during that time "ſhall, every year, paſs the mutiny bill, which "provides for the maintenance, and *legal* eſta- "bliſhment of the army." And that writer ſeems to view the *contingency* in the light of a certainty.

Take all theſe circumſtances and combine them together, and what do they prove? why, ſir, they clearly prove, firſt, that the executive power cannot *lawfully* keep a ſtanding army, *without* the conſent of parliament, and they prove preſumptively, and as ſtrongly as preſumption *can* prove any thing, that the executive power looks upon itſelf as *always certain* of the conſent of parliament to that meaſure, or it would not *preſume* to enliſt its ſoldiers for the term of their natural lives. The corollary to this, then, undoubtedly is, that we are *in reality*, ſaddled with a *perpetual ſtanding army*, and amuſed and deceived with the nonſenſical *farce* of its being only continued from year to year, at the will and with the conſent of parliament.

But,

But, ſir, admitting the forlorn hope, for the ſake of argument, that the parliament ſhould be willing to diſband the army entirely, " by not " paſſing the mutiny act." It is much to be feared, that a queſtion might ariſe, Whether or no they have the *power?* We have read indeed, in certain romantic publications of the *omnipotence of Parliament.* I flatter myſelf, however, ſuch doctrine will never be regarded by the inhabitants of Great-Britain in any other light than as *romance.* And now to the point in queſtion, viz. " that parliament ſhould next year refuſe to paſs " the mutiny bill, and thereby ſhew themſelves " willing to diſband the army." Can they do it? *To be, or not to be?* That is the queſtion.

On this occaſion, I ſhall forbear to give any opinion of *my own*; but I beg leave to offer to the conſideration of your readers, thoſe of perſons highly eminent for their knowledge and abilities, and of courſe more to be relied on than I pretend to be. And firſt,

Mr. TRENCHARD, in his Hiſtory of Standing Armies, page 103, ſays, " If the army be " continued but a few years, it will be accounted " a part of the prerogative; and it will be thought " as great a violation to attempt the diſbanding

" it, as the guards in Charles the ſecond's time. " It will be interpreted a deſign to dethrone the " king." Theſe are ſerious conſequences attending the careleſsneſs, neglect, or complaiſance of the Repreſentatives of the People, *as they are called.*

I fear our times may prove Mr. Trenchard a true prophet. Our taxes are accumulating to ſuch an enormous extent, that, ere long, we may aſſuredly expect the people will be petitioning to be eaſed of *ſome of them.* The expence of a ſtanding army is one of the moſt oppreſſive burdens we are loaded with, and it is one of the moſt unneceſſary that *can* be to this iſland. It is therefore the moſt likely to be the firſt the people may wiſh to get rid of;—when that time comes, it will be ſeen whether Mr. Trenchard was right in his ſurmiſe as to the laſt ſentence;—that he *was ſo*, in ſaying, " That it will be accounted a part " of the prerogative," take the following authorities:—In a debate, A. D. 1734, on a motion for addreſſing the king, to know by whoſe advice the Duke of Bolton and Lord Cobham were removed from the command of their regiments, the Duke of Argyle ſpoke as follows, without laughing: " I hope, my Lords, there " are no gentlemen in the army that ever were,

" or ever can be prevailed on, either to act or " ſpeak contrary to their conſcience, by the fear " of their being turned out of their commiſſion. " I hope there never *will* be ſuch in our army." And afterwards,—" What ſignifies a *prerogative*, " if the king is never to make uſe of it without " being obliged to give an account to parliament " for ſo doing." Deb. of the Lords 4. 215. 216. Be it remembered that the above motion was made on the rejection of a bill " for making " military officers independent of the miniſtry ;" *and that*, becauſe the Duke of Bolton and Lord Cobham had been deprived of their commiſſions juſt before *for voting againſt the miniſter.*

Other court lords, on the ſame occaſion, ſaid, this was breaking in upon the king's (that is, the miniſter's) royal prerogative. Lord Bathurſt, as a great man, and as true a patriot, as this country could ever boaſt, anſwered, " That " it was the duty of the lords, as the king's he- " reditary counſellors, and was accordingly uſual " for them to deſire to be informed, who were " the adviſers of ſuch exertions of royal prero- " gative as gave umbrage to themſelves or to the " people." " The army (continued he) has " really no dependence upon parliament: the " king, indeed, depends upon parliament for a

" legal

" legal power to keep a ſtanding army in time
" of peace, and for enabling him to pay them
" and diſciplining them according to law. But
" if in any future time the parliament ſhould
" think it neceſſary to reduce a part of the army,
" and, of conſequence, make no proviſion for
" their pay,—the reſolution of parliament could
" not break any one regiment in the kingdom:
" the officers might all legally continue in their
" reſpective commands; and if the king then
" upon the throne ſhould not think fit to break
" any of them, they might indeed very probably
" join with the King in raiſing it *contrary to law*;
" eſpecially if he, foreſeeing what would hap-
" pen, had taken care to model them for that
" purpoſe, which any king might ſoon do while
" the army continues upon the ſame footing it
" is on at preſent. And for this reaſon, my
" lords, I muſt be of opinion, that all theſe ar-
" guments which have been uſed for ſhewing
" us the danger of making an army independent,
" are ſo many arguments for ſhewing us the
" danger of an army's being entirely dependent
" upon *one branch only* of our legiſlature; and,
" conſequently, are good arguments for the bill
" which was deſigned to make the army not
" entirely dependent upon *any one*, but upon *all*
" *the three* branches of our legiſlature." Deb.
Lds. 4. 211.

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The foregoing authorities appear to me ſufficient to convince 'A Friend to the Military,' and all your other readers, who have a doubt about the matter, that if the parliament ſhould not next year paſs the mutiny bill, that, nevertheleſs, the army would not thereby be diſbanded *ipſo facto*; and further, that the *contingent* of the mutiny bill not paſſing, is by no means ſo great an objection to a ſoldier's enliſting himſelf for life, as your correſpondent ſeems to imagine: as it evidently appears the executive power is *certain* of the parliament's conſent by the contract it enters into: were it otherwiſe, the parliament would long, ere this, have been jealous of the encroachment, and revolted at the idea. Therefore, ſir, "Qui vult decipi, *decipiatur*." Thoſe who are determined to be deceived, let them—nobody elſe can.

Having thus anſwered, to the beſt of my ability, ſuch part of your correſpondent's letter as "A Lawyer" left untouched, it would ill become me, at preſent, to treſpaſs further on the limits of your paper. If you think this deſerving of a place, and have no objection to my further thoughts on the ſubject, I will hereafter endeavour to ſhew (and I think I can do it to the ſatisfaction of every impartial mind) that a ſtand-

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ing army, *in time of peace*, is not only *unconſtitutional*, and adverſe to our intereſts *as a free ſtate*, but that it is an unneceſſary, as well as enormous and grievous charge on the ſubjects of this realm: that is one of thoſe great and growing evils, which ſtrongly evinces the abſolute neceſſity of a *ſpeedy reform in parliamaent:* that the meaſure lately adopted, *of building barracks* in various parts of the kingdom, is highly unwarrantable and illegal: and that the adviſers of the meaſure are deſerving of an impeachment, and exemplary puniſhment, for ſo unprecedented and daring an attempt *againſt the liberties of a free people.*

ALBANICUS.

TO THE PRINTER.

Sir,

IN my former letter I advanced, "that a "ſtanding army, in time of peace, was *uncon-* "*ſtitutional*, repugnant to, and incompatible "with the intereſts of a *free ſtate*;" and as this country was *once* entitled to that appellation, and cannot be ſaid at the preſent moment to be altogether

gether otherwiſe; at leaſt, not to have loſt its pretenſions to the claim, I entreat your patience and that of your readers, while I endeavour to ſubſtantiate the proofs which I have already undertaken to bring in ſupport of my aſſertions. To do this with effect, it will be neceſſary to take a comprehenſive view of the ſubject, and to refer back to ancient as well as modern hiſtory. I ſhall do this with as much conciſeneſs as the nature and importance of the ſubject will admit, and as I fear it will be impoſſible with every precaution I can uſe of that kind, to compreſs the matter within the compaſs of one letter, I ſhall requeſt the liberty of dividing the ſubject in ſuch a manner as I think will treſpaſs leaſt on the limits of your paper, and on the time and avocations of your ſeveral readers.

To refer then to the ancients; permit me to obſerve, that no legiſlator ever founded a free government, but he ſtudiouſly avoided this Charibdis,—a mercenary army,—as a rock againſt which his Commonwealth muſt certainly be ſhipwrecked; witneſs the Iſraelites, ("David "king of Iſrael hath left behind him the beſt "model for a militia, the world ever ſaw; ſuch "a model as it would be the trueſt intereſt and "wiſdom of every nation to imitate. For by

" this inſtitution every man in *Iſrael* became, in " his order, a regular well-diſciplined ſoldier, in " perfect conſiſtency with his being at the ſame " time a freeholder and a free-man. Thus the " ſtate enjoyed all the advantages of ſecurity from " foreign invaſions, or inteſtine commotions, " derived to it from a ſtanding army; and at " the ſame time, avoided all the evils of it,—great " expence, luxury and corruption of every kind, " for want of due employment for ſuch great " numbers; immenſe detriment to the public, " from ſo many hands unemployed in uſeful la- " bour; and immenſe detriment to its liber- " ties, from their too great attachment to the " perſon and power of the prince, in conſe- " quence of their entire dependence upon him." See the whole paſſage in *Delany's Life of David)* Athenians, Corinthians, Achaians, Lacedemonians, Thebans, Samnites, and Romans; none of which, whilſt they kept their liberty, were ever known to keep any ſoldiers in conſtant pay within their cities, or ever ſuffered any of their ſubjects to make war their profeſſion; well knowing that the ſword and ſovereignty always march hand in hand; and therefore they trained their own citizens, and inhabitants of the territories about them, perpetually in arms, which made their Commonwealths, in fact, ſo many

trained

trained and diſciplined militias; the ſureſt way of preſerving themſelves both at home and abroad, both from domeſtic affronts or tumults among themſelves, and foreign invaſions of ambitious and encroaching neighbours. Arms were never put into the hands of any but thoſe who were intereſted to preſerve the public peace, and who fighting always "*pro aris et focis*, *for* "*their fields and fire-ſides*," thought themſelves abundantly overpaid in repelling invaders, and then returned with ſatisfaction to manage with freedom their own affairs.

The citizen, the ſoldier, the huſbandman, were then the ſame, for *all* promiſcuouſly took up arms in the hour of common danger, in defence of the public ſafety: that done, they laid down thoſe arms with more pleaſure than they took them up. Among the Romans we find, that the beſt and braveſt of their Generals came from the plough; contentedly returning to it again when the work was over, and never demanding their triumphs till they laid down their commands, and reduced themſelves to the ſtate of private men. A prudent caution, worthy of a great people, ſenſible of the ineſtimable value of liberty, and of courſe, jealous and fearful of being deprived of it. This celebrated Common-

wealth never permitted arms in the hands of any other perſons than *citizens*, till they were obliged from the encreaſe of their empire, to keep a ſtipendiary ſoldiary abroad in foreign parts, either for the holding or conquering of provinces, the dangerous conſequence of which was, they were obliged, in order to prevent them from coming into CAMPANIA, to make a law, and put an inſcription at the paſſage of the *Rubicon*, "Imperator five miles, &c.—Let every "commander, ſoldier, and armed Prince, leave "here his arms and ſtandard, and not preſume "to come in military array, farther than this "river." A ſecond provident precaution which forcibly evinces how dangerous the Romans deemed a 'ſtanding army' to the liberties of a free people; and which was afterwards fatally proved to them by Julius, who having traiterouſly and wickedly broken this law, had nothing left but to puſh on his victorious army to Rome itſelf, which he did, and overturned thoſe liberties, to protect which againſt foreign invaders, this very army was raiſed, and he himſelf placed by his abuſed fellow citizens at its head as General. By ſuffering the eſtabliſhment of 'ſtanding armies,' *Athens* was in like manner enſlaved by *Piſiſtratus*; *Corinth* by *Timophanes*; *Syracruſe* by *Agathocles*; Milan by Sforza; *Sweden* by *Guſtavus Ericſon*; *England* by *Cromwell*, &c.

When

When the Goths and Vandals over-ran the weſtern parts of the Roman empire, the Generals of armies made themſelves Kings of the countries they conquered. They divided the lands among their officers, called Barons, and they again gave ſmall parcels to their ſoldiers, who became their vaſſals, and held by military ſervice. The King's revenue aroſe out of his demeſne lands. There was no mercenary army. Every man was a ſoldier, obliged to fight for his ſuperior, upon which tenure he held his lands. The curious reader may conſult Lord Lyttleton's Life of Hen. II. where this ſubject is handled at large, and the nature of the feudal ſyſtem fully explained. This continued to be the ſtate of things in *Europe* for about 1100 years, from A. D. 400. This brings us to the reign of our Henry VII. who raiſed no ſmall jealouſy among our prudent, cautious anceſtors, by the augmentation of the Yeomen of the Guards from 50 to 100, which was the whole ſtanding army of his times.

Queen Elizabeth's whole reign (ſays Lord Bolingbroke) may be almoſt called a ſtate of defenſive and offenſive war; in *England* as well as *Ireland*; in the *Indies* as well as in *Europe*; yet ſhe ventured to go through this ſtate, if it was

a venture without the help of a 'ſtanding army.' Whenever ſhe wanted troops, her ſubjects flocked to her ſtandard; and her reign affords moſt illuſtrious proofs, that all the ends of ſecurity and of glory too, may be anſwered in this iſland without the charge and danger of the expedient juſt mentioned. This aſſertion will not be contradicted by thoſe who recollect in how many places, and on how many occaſions, her forces fought and conquered the beſt diſciplined veteran troops in Europe.

When the Duke d' *Alencon* came over to *England*, and for ſome time had admired the riches of the city, the conduct of this great queen, the wiſdom of her government, and the magnificence of her court, he aſked her admidſt ſo much ſplendor, where were her *guards?* which queſtion ſhe reſolved a few days after, as ſhe took him in her coach through the city, when pointing to the people (who received her in crowds with repeated acclamations) "Theſe "ſaid ſhe, my Lord, are my guards; theſe have "their hands, their hearts, and their purſes, al-"ways ready at my command." And theſe were guards indeed, who defended her through a long and ſucceſsful reign of forty four years, againſt all the machinations of *Rome*, the power

of

of *Spain*, a diſputed title, and the perpetual conſpiracies of her own popiſh ſubjects; a ſecurity the *Roman* Emperors could not boaſt of, with their prætorian bands, and their eaſtern and weſtern armies.

To this great Queen ſucceeded the deteſted houſe of *Stuart*; the firſt of whom, the *Ideot James*, ſignalized himſelf no otherwiſe than by his quarrels with his parliaments (the lower houſe I mean, for the *Lords*, I crave their pardons, were always obſequious. Cecil, afterwards Earl of Saliſbury, told him on his acceſſion, "That he ſhould find his Engliſh ſubjects "like aſſes, on whom he might lay any burthen, "and ſhould need neither bit nor bridle, but "their aſſes' ears;" and the reſt of the ariſtocratical flock evinced, during his whole reign, that though the *common* aſſes ſhould kick ever ſo, their *noble* body would never give the lie to their *Bell-weather*). James however did no more than give repeated inſtances of his own folly and weakneſs, and lay the foundation for thoſe diſputes, and ſtruggles for PREROGATIVE, which brought his ſon and ſucceſſor, the *bleſſed Martyr*, as he is called, to the block.

The

The militia was eſtabliſhed by *Alfred*, and fell into decay under the *Stuarts*. A proof that the militia is good, and ought to be kept up. The *Stuarts* were friends to *ſtanding armies*; an indubitable demonſtration, that ſtanding armies are *dangerous*. When Charles I. ever bent on miſchief, propoſed to give *Spain* the *Iriſh* army, which had no viſible want of them, the *Lords* agreed immediately: but the wiſe, and conſequently the ſuſpicious Commons, found a deſign in this, viz. to keep up an embodied army, which he could call over from Flanders when he pleaſed; and poſitively refuſed their conſent. Yet it is well known what armies Charles did raiſe, and in what bloody buſineſs he employed them.

Fearful of treſpaſſing too far at once, on the limits of a paper ſo truly excellent for the extenſiveneſs and variety of its information, I will for the preſent take my leave, requeſting your permiſſion to reſume the ſubject in a future paper; and in the mean time craving your readers to obſerve and keep in mind, how uniformly cautious and jealous our brave and hardy anceſtors were, of any thing in the ſhape of a ſtanding army; though the people of the preſent day, in a time of the profoundeſt peace as to this kingdom, look with ſeeming apathy on the expence

of

of maintaining 40,000 drones and leeches in red coats, and ſeem in patience and inertneſs under their ſufferings, to reſemble indeed the ſluggiſh beaſt of burthen, to which Saliſbury formerly compared them. A modern Penſioner of writing memory, and *ſublime* abilities, has grouped us together as a herd of *ſwine*, which is a ſtill more filthy and groveling animal.—But I hope for the honour of the national character, that a day *will* come, in which we may exultingly cry out

" Tempora mutantur & nos mutamur in illis."

" The times are changed, and with them we are altered."

ALBANICUS.

TO THE PRINTER.

Sir,

I Now come to a period of the hiſtory of this country which fully proves the danger of an army to the liberties of the people, and at once diſplays in the ſtrongeſt colours the wiſe and prudent conduct of our anceſtors ſince that time, in being ſo jealous of this armed body of men, and the folly and raſhneſs of the preſent day, in permitting ſo heavy a burden to be laid

on our ſhoulders, and looking on it with a torpor and apathy which is at once wonderful and criminal. The period I mean, is that when an infatuated and miſguided, an hypocritical and arbitrary Monarch, by his illegal and deſpotic proceedings, compelled his Parliament and the Nation to take up arms in defence of all that was dear to them; in the final iſſue of which conteſt that deluded and unhappy man paid the forfeit of his crimes in the loſs of both his crown and his life.

Then it was, Sir, that the danger of the army—this Hydra among mankind—began to ſhew itſelf. Then it was that the Parliament were twice diſſolved, and turned out of their places, by the very armies which they raiſed and paid; firſt by Cromwell, and afterwards by Lambert. Then it was that General *Skippon* wrote to them in theſe words—"The army is "a formidable body, not to be provoked, and "will be upon you before you are aware." And that *Fairfax* received the thanks of both Houſes *for enſlaving them*, by ſeizing their members and confining them.

Cromwell, the mock patron of liberty, eſtabliſhed a ſtanding army of 10,000 horſe and

20,000

20,000 foot; which was *his* way of ſettling a free conſtitution. Immediately after which he did the moſt tyrannical thing ever heard of: he excluded, by military force, almoſt 100 members from the Houſe, becauſe they were not of his ſide, and the remaining members gratefully requeſted him to become King.

In the time of the Republic, when England was in her way to the higheſt pinnacle of glory, the chief attention was paid to the fleet. Kings, on the contrary, truſt chiefly to the army, as being the proper inſtrument for gaining the great object of Kings.—"It is doubtful (ſays our cele-"brated female hiſtorian) whether a naval force "could be rendered uſeful in any capacity, but "that of extending *the power and proſperity of* "*the country*." She obſerves, that *Cromwell* could not have eſtabliſhed his uſurpation but by the army; that after the diſſolution of the republican Parliament, the army was the only viſible acting power; and that they accordingly took upon themſelves the whole government of the State, *and ſweet was the government thereof.*

When the peaceable *Richard*, the ſon of *Cromwell*, ſucceeded to his protectoral power, he ſoon found that the officers deſigned to com-

pel him to diſſolve the Parliament; he was therefore obliged to ſubmit to their reſolutions, in conſequence of which they aſſumed the Government entirely to themſelves.*

Many of our hiſtorians have been corrupted and bribed to write and ſay, that the people of this country were under the neceſſity of giving up a republican form of Government, becauſe it was incompatible with, and contrary to the temper and genius of the people; but this is a *palpable untruth*; for it is a fact well known to all thoſe who have thought it worth their while to examine into the matter, and judge for themſelves, that upon the reſignation of Richard Cromwell, the Parliament would have eſtabliſhed republican Government, if they had not been bullied out of it by *Monk* and the *Army*, who brought in again upon their country, the curſe of the *Stuarts*.

In

* At this time it was that Addreſſes to the Executive Power *firſt* made their appearance, and were poured into the palace to Richard from every corner of the kingdom, each and every one containing offers of the *people's lives and fortunes*, in ſupport of the then Government. Theſe invaluable tenders of loyalty and affection, Richard carefully depoſited in a large trunk; and when in a little time afterwards the officers took poſſeſſion of the palace, obſerving ſome ſoldiers carrying the trunk away, he begged them to be very careful of it, for it contained the *lives and fortunes of all the good people of England*. A witty and ſarcaſtic ſpeech, deſcriptive of the contempt in which he held the empty and deluſive flatteries of addreſſing ſycophants, who would bow the knee to power though a *Golden Calf*, *Caligula's Horſe*, or a human Driveller were in the ſeat.

In ſhort, there was nothing but doing and undoing in thoſe times; the Parliament being as much ſlaves to the army then, as they are in modern times, the preſent always excepted, by the Court.

The profligate and abandoned Monarch who ſucceeded (Charles II.) propoſed, it is well known, by means of the Army, to enſlave the Kingdom.* And the garriſon at Tangiers being brought over to England, "ſerved to augment "(ſays Mr. Hume) that ſmall army which the "ſaid King relied on, as one ſolid baſis of his "authority." In this ſame reign, the Commons of the ſecond Parliament voted the Standing Army and King's Guards illegal. And Mr. Hume, in his hiſtory, which Lord Chatham calls "His Apology for the Stuarts," approves this *as neceſſary to Liberty*. Yet Mr. Hume is univerſally allowed to be a monarchal writer.

Nay, the Commons were at this time jealous even of the *Militia*, and doubting whether there had

* Biſhop Burnet obſerves, Algernon Sydney returned to England, "when "the Parliament was preſſing the King into a war. The Court of France ob- "tained leave for him to return. He did all he could to divert people from "that war; ſo that ſome took him for a Penſioner of France. But to thoſe "to whom he durſt ſpeak freely, he ſaid he knew it was all a juggle; that our "Court was in an entire confidence with France, and had no other deſign in "this ſhew of a war, but to raiſe an army, and keep it beyond ſea till it was "trained and modelled." *Hiſtory of his own Times*. Vol. I

had not been too great a confidence repoſed in the King by that generation of fond fools, who received him at his reſtoration, and by their ſervile, fulſome adulation, ſpoiled him, voted that he ſhould not have power to keep the *Militia* in arms above a fortnight together, without conſent of Parliament. *We* are not afraid of above 40,000 Soldiery wholly dependent on the Crown, and detached for life from the people.

Clarendon at laſt perſuaded this King that he could not be ſafe on his throne, without diſbanding the *Army*, which having been once above all other powers in the State, and having modelled it at their pleaſure, would not be likely to brook ſubmiſſion to a King. It was accordingly broke, all but about 1000 horſe, and 5000 foot. But though this meaſure is generally attributed to *Lord Clarendon*, I am of opinion, and ſo are many others, that the advice of another man, not an Engliſhman, greatly ſwayed with Charles. *Gourville*, whom the King became acquainted with at the Court of France, and whom he eſteemed to have the ſoundeſt head of any Frenchman he had ever ſeen, frequently told him—"*Qu' un Roi d' Angleterre, qui veut etre "l' homme de ſon peuple, eſt le plus grand Roi du "Monde; mais, ſi veut etre quelqae choſe d'*

"*avantage,*

" *avantage, par Dieu il n'eſt plus rein.*"—" *That* " *a King of England who will be the man of his* " *people, is the greateſt King in the world; but* " *that if he is determined to be any thing more,* " *by G—d from that moment he is nothing.*"

James the 2d, even in his brother's life time, laid the main ſtreſs of the *Kingſhip* upon the Army, and in his letter to the Prince of Orange, he ſays, " If once they (the Duke of York's " enemies) get the Navy, purge the Guards and " Garriſons, and put new men in, they will be " abſolute maſters." And again, " The King " (Charles II.) has yet the Fleet, the Garriſons " and Guards, ſo that if he will ſtand by himſelf " he may yet be a King." *Dalrymple's Memoirs, v. 2. p. 211.*

" Upon the defeat of Monmouth's rebellion, " King James II. became intoxicated with proſ- " perity. Inſtead of diſbanding his army, he " encamped them on Hounſlow Heath, and re- " ſolved to make it the great inſtrument of his " power." On the landing of the Prince of Orange, afterwards William III. this army laid down their arms, and refuſed to fight. And from hence, advocates for a Standing Army have argued that ſuch a body has not always been inimical

inimical to Liberty. But let no one be deceived and deluded by this; for it is an indubitable fact well known, that this army would have oppoſed the Prince of Orange and the Cauſe of Freedom, with the ſame energy and force that they oppoſed Monmouth, had not James fooliſhly, but fortunately for the liberties of this country, diſcovered that he meaned, as ſoon as ever it was in his power, to diſband *that army*, and ſupply their places with a ſtill greater *Hoſt of Papiſts*. Thus ſeeing themſelves in danger of being ſoon deprived of their religion and bread and butter, at one ſtroke, they made a virtue of neceſſity, and inſtantly adopted the motto of fighting—*Pro aris et focis*,—*for their fields and fireſides*,—doubly gratified in the idea of keeping their preſent pay by joining the Prince, and that ſuch as did fall, would at leaſt have the ſatisfaction of being ſent to heaven *their own way*.

This event gave the death-blow, the finiſhing ſtroke to the reign of that Tyrant; and his abdication opened a field, in the extenſive plains of which our Politics and our Government took ſo different a turn, and underwent ſo material a change in the Revolution which ſucceeded, that I ſhall beg leave to make it the commencement of the ſubject of my next letter.

ALBANICUS.

TO THE PRINTER.

Sir,

IN my former letters, I have endeavoured to comprize within each, a ſeparate period in the hiſtory of this country, reſpecting the gradual increaſe of the ſtanding army; and in that courſe, am now come to the period which is *commonly called* the Glorious Revolution. Whether that great event deſerves the various praiſes that have been paſſed on it, or not, is not the purport of theſe letters to diſcover.* The evil of a *Standing Army* is my object to point out at preſent, and to that I ſhall endeavour to confine myſelf. It may not be amiſs, however, to obſerve, that the complexion of political affairs now became widely different. Hitherto it was *Prerogative* that was dreaded by the people; this was the Monſter they every moment expected to devour their Rights, Liberties, and Privileges; and the *Standing Army*, as the main prop and ſupport of this *Prerogative*, was there-

* Lord Molesworth, who lived at the time, and of whoſe Whiggiſm no doubt can be made, ſays, "all we pretend to by the late Revolution, bought "at ſo great an expence, was to be as we were, and that every man ſhould "have his own again, the effecting of which may be called a piece of good "luck, which is *the beſt that can be ſaid of it.*"

fore regarded by them with the moſt jealous eye.

Prerogative, defeated and deſtroyed as it was thought by the Revolution, was ſucceeded by an enemy to our Liberty not ſo apparent, but far more dangerous, in as much as one was open in its attacks and viſible to obſervation; its ſucceſſor, *a Snake in the Graſs*, whoſe attacks were covert and ſecret—which glided unperceived into the moſt private and deepeſt receſſes of the State, and ſcattering its baneful poiſon on all ſides,—contaminated and diſeaſed all deſcriptions of perſons who came within its reach. This baſe and deluſive ſucceſſor to the fiend *Prerogative*, was the ſmooth, ſubtle, and deſtructive ſpirit called INFLUENCE, the parent and the nurſe of Corruption, whoſe latent and unobſerved effects have undermined and ſapped the fair fabric of the Engliſh Conſtitution, infinitely more in about a Century, than all the open and and daring attacks of Prerogative and Deſpotiſm combined, were able to compaſs in the lengthened courſe of ſixteen hundred years. But perhaps it may be aſked, what has this to do with the *Standing Army*? Reader, I will tell thee. *A Standing Army* is at this moment a ſtronger ſupport of the INFLUENCE complained of, than ever

it

it was to the Monſter *Prerogative.* This I will ſhew in due time; but will now proceed by taking a regular view of the progreſs and increaſe of it, from 1688.

Here, before I proceed, I muſt entreat my readers will have the goodneſs to recollect, that the purport of all my preceding letters has been to point out the danger of a Standing Army to the liberties of a *free State*, and the unconſtitutional light in which it has been invariably viewed by our brave and wiſe anceſtors. And ſurely there can be none whoſe judgments we ought to rely on with ſuch entire confidence in this reſpect, as thoſe who formed and raiſed the Conſtitution by their valour, and cemented it with their beſt blood.

A numerous Army always gives cauſe to ſuſpect that the Government is either afraid of the People, or has a deſign upon the People. This was undoubtedly the leading idea in the minds of the firſt characters in this nation, at the time of the Revolution. On the acceſſion of King William (when Prerogative lay proſtrate at the foot of the People, and its ſucceſſor *Influence* had not, as yet, raiſed its horrid creſt) the Declaration of Rights ſays, "An Army in

" time of peace, unleſs by parliamentary autho-
" rity, *is illegal.*" And, if there be reaſon to ſuſpect Parliament of corruption, it may very reaſonably be added, that even *with* parliamentary authority, it is dangerous to Liberty.

It was the opinion of the great Lord Sommers, one of the firſt promoters, and ſtrongeſt ſupporters of the Glorious Revolution, *as it is called*, " that any man who would ſuggeſt to
" King William, that he could not be ſafe un-
" leſs he were ſurrounded with Guards, ought
" to be abhorred by every *true Engliſhman.*" And we are told the ſagacious *Fletcher* of Scotland dropped the friendſhip of Lord Sunderland, becauſe he voted for the Army. " I would fain
" know (ſays Fletcher, p. 37) if there be any
" other way of making a Prince abſolute, than
" by allowing him a Standing Army; if by it
" all Princes have not been made abſolute, *if*
" *without it any.* Whether our enemies ſhall
" conquer us, is uncertain; but whether a
" Standing Army will enſlave us, neither reaſon
" nor experience will ſuffer us to doubt. There-
" fore no pretence of danger from abroad can be
" an argument for keeping up mercenary forces."

Thus

Thus thought and ſpoke the Friends to *Liberty*, to the *People*, and to a *free Conſtitution*. Mr. Hume calls the Army "a mortal diſtemper "in the Britiſh Government, of which it muſt "at laſt inevitably periſh." Let us now turn our eyes to, and take a view of the language of even *the beſt of Kings*.

Mr. Trenchard, in his Hiſtory of Standing Armies, p. 80, takes notice, that the Prince of Orange, in his firſt declaration, ſet forth all the oppreſſions of the reign of King James II. excepting only that of his keeping up a Standing Army in time of peace; as if he had thought that no very great grievance. William promiſed, however, to ſend home the foreign forces he brought with him, as ſoon as he eſtabliſhed a free Parliament, Liberty, and the Proteſtant Religion, &c. and he kept his word ſo well, that he and his Parliament had almoſt ſeriouſly quarrelled, becauſe he would not ſend away his Dutch Guards; ſo much are even good Kings attached to Power and to Armies, the inſtruments of power. But Parliament, on this head, were unqueſtionably reſolute, and refuſed to let the Dutch Guards ſtay with him, though he requeſted it as a perſonal favour: and they went on reforming the Army, till at laſt they ſettled

it

" time of peace, unleſs by parliamentary autho-
" rity, *is illegal.*" And, if there be reaſon to ſuſpect Parliament of corruption, it may very reaſonably be added, that even *with* parliamentary authority, it is dangerous to Liberty.

It was the opinion of the great Lord Sommers, one of the firſt promoters, and ſtrongeſt ſupporters of the Glorious Revolution, *as it is called*, " that any man who would ſuggeſt to " King William, that he could not be ſafe un-
" leſs he were ſurrounded with Guards, ought " to be abhorred by every *true Engliſhman.*" And we are told the ſagacious *Fletcher* of Scotland dropped the friendſhip of Lord Sunderland, becauſe he voted for the Army. " I would fain " know (ſays Fletcher, p. 37) if there be any " other way of making a Prince abſolute, than " by allowing him a Standing Army; if by it " all Princes have not been made abſolute, *if* " *without it any.* Whether our enemies ſhall " conquer us, is uncertain; but whether a " Standing Army will enſlave us, neither reaſon " nor experience will ſuffer us to doubt. There-
" fore no pretence of danger from abroad can be " an argument for keeping up mercenary forces."

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it at about ten thouſand. The King, who was highly offended at their jealouſy of him, ſaid to Burnet, that if he had known how the Engliſh would treat him, he would never have meddled with them; and ſwore "if he had a ſon, they "ſhould not leave him." That is, it would have been worth his while to keep them in ſpite of Parliament. It is plain he thought this was practicable, and if it was, then any thing may be practicable by him, who has the command of a mercenary army.

Did our *Glorious Deliverer*, as he is called, really think the people were not as anxious about their own ſafety as he could be? What was it to him, what army the people of England choſe to keep up? Did not they know beſt? And was it not their affair much more than his?— But hold, methinks I eſpy in the ſchemes and conduct of this *Glorious Deliverer*, the latent views of what is called in ſome countries a Tyrant and a Traitor. Had he had a ſon he would have kept his foreign mercenaries in ſpite of Parliament, and in that caſe it ſeems probable our Liberties would not have been of much longer duration than under the Tyrant James. As it was, after all the debates, voting, reſolving, and diſbanding, he and his Miniſters contrived to

over-

over-reach the Parliament, and raiſe a body of 3000 marines, over and above the 10,000 land forces before mentioned, under a pretence that they were not a land-force but a water-force.

" Thus (ſays Mr. Trenchard) what our " Courts for above 1000 years together never had " the effrontery to aſk—what the Penſion-Par- " liament could not think of without aſtoniſh- " ment—what *James's* Parliament choſen almoſt " by himſelf, could not hear debated with pati- " ence, we are likely to have the honour of eſta- " bliſhing under a deliverance."

Mr. Trenchard, p. 87, throws out broad hints that the ſtrange and continual miſmanagement of *ſea* affairs in King William's time, could hardly have come about any other way, than through a deſign of magnifying the importance of *land* armies. And I will take the liberty of likewiſe throwing out a broad hint, that we have ſeen the ſame traitorous policy carried on at different periods, by various Miniſters, who were yet very good Whigs.

The whole reign of Queen Anne, till the Peace of Utretcht, was a continued ſucceſſion of Wars on the Continent, for the expreſs purpoſe of

of a feaſible excuſe for keeping up a Standing Army in theſe kingdoms, which then amounted to 10,000 men, and was afterwards increaſed to 12,000, including invalids. The great victories gained at that time over the French in *land-fights*, were very prejudicial. They added ſplendidly to the fame, fortune, pride and vain-glory of Marlborough and Eugene, and ſubſtantially to the debt of the Nation;—but that is to be borne by the *Swiniſh Multitude*, and therefore of no moment to Kings, Miniſters, and their Dependents.

Every opportunity a Miniſter and his tools have of embezzling the public money, is an evil. The keeping up of a numerous Standing Army furniſhes this very plentifully. It has been alledged that the great Commanders under the umbrageous ſhade of the miniſterial Oak, have conſtantly ſeveral thouſand men in their pockets. Falſe muſters were found A. D. 1711; not above two-thirds of the muſter rolls were effective men. The annual eſtimate of the Army in thoſe times uſed to be about 700,000l. one third of which, therefore, or 233,000l. a year, muſt have been ſunk in certain pockets. Many Debtors were protected by the Military. Chartres, guilty this way, and of tampering with witneſſes produced before the Committee, the

Queen

Queen was to be informed, and desired to punish Chartres, and all other persons concerned. It was found that subjects had been imprisoned in the Savoy, without authority in writing from a Commission Officer; that they had been put in irons, and sold to be sent abroad. The Queen was desired to give certain soldiers their dismission from the service, and protection against pressing, for having witnessed these facts. Thus the people are plundered; and amidst the shew of a numerous army, deprived of the advantage, if advantage there be in reality. See Deb. Lords, 8. 69. on a motion about the absence of Officers from Minorca. Out of nineteen Officers, only five were left on duty on the island, at a time when the invasion of it was threatened by Spain, so publickly, that all Europe knew it.

Here, Sir, I shall conclude for the present this aggravating list of evils, which inevitably spring from maintaining a Standing Army. I feel my indignation rise so repeatedly, while I am recollecting and transcribing them, that had I not pledged myself to go through with the subject, I should lay down my pen, and retire from it with disgust. Great and grievous as those are which I have already enumerated, they are comparatively small to what is yet to come,

in point of the burden which they are the cauſe of being ſaddled on the *Swiniſh Multitude*; we are yet but come to the amount of 12,000 men; it remains to be traced up to more than 40,000. Surely, Sir, nothing but the moſt conſummate ignorance could ever have prevailed on the people of this country to ſuffer ſuch intolerable evils to accumulate to the height they have. If they are ſuch debaſed and willing ſlaves as patiently to permit them to continue after being made acquainted with their nature, extent, and deformity, I can only conſole myſelf in the thought of having done my duty to my country, and lament that "Freedom and Engliſh Grandeur are "no more."

ALBANICUS.

TO THE PRINTER.

Sir,

AFTER having in ſeveral former letters traced the origin and progreſs of Standing Armies, together with the various evils attendant upon them, I am now arrived near to the cloſe of the ſubject; a more painful one than which, no well-wiſher to this abuſed, and oppreſſed country, can ever eaſily contemplate. If the people feel in reading, the ſorrow and indignation

that

that I do in writing, it will make the deſired impreſſion; and they will ſeriouſly, and univerſally think of petitioning to be eaſed of ſo enormous, and uſeleſs a burden; if they do not, but continue ſupine and torpid under the load; and ſo inſenſible of the weight that cruſhes them, that they are determined patiently to bear it, like "the aſſes Saliſbury has deſcribed them to be," this nation is more nearly fitted to receive the chains of Slavery, than I hoped and thought it was.

I am now come to the reign of George I. in which, on account of the Rebellion in 1716, the army was encreaſed to 32,000 men; but even *under theſe circumſtances*, the Minority Lords entered a proteſt againſt it. In 1717, Walpole (afterwards the *Father of corruption)* oppoſed all Courts Martial. "They, he ſaid, who gave the "power of blood, gave blood." He was in thoſe days a flaming patriot. Some time after, when he came to be a Miniſter, he was better reconciled to Standing Armies, and Mutiny Bills in times of peace.* It has been the great misfortune and bane of this ill-fated nation, to be the

 continual

* We have ſince read of *other Miniſters* who have changed their opinions as diametrically oppoſite to thoſe they avowed, before they became ſuch, as ever Walpole did.

continual ſacrifice of *infamous apoſtates*, who the moment they have got into power, have become more determined ſupporters of arbitrary meaſures than ever their predeceſſors were. This was the caſe with Walpole, in ſo notorious a degree, that he became odious to, and execrated by the whole nation; but notwithſtanding that he ſet them at defiance for many years together, he never dared to aſk a Standing Army in time of peace, above 17,000 men. From 1718, to the year 1743, the Miniſtry went on increaſing, and the Minority Lords, proteſting; and in this laſt mentioned year, the Military amounted to 23,000 and the Marines (which are to all intents and purpoſes *land forces)* to 11,550: and ſince that period, we have had very little oppoſition to its increaſe. The Mutiny Bill paſſes every year, as a thing of courſe; and our Standing Army has been, during the laſt ſeven years of *profound peace*, upwards of 40,000 men; 18,000 of which are in England, and 13,000 in Ireland, when at the ſame time there has never been occaſion for one ſingle regiment, if Government was upon the footing it ought to be, and which the Conſtitution has pointed out.* The annual expence

* "Thoſe who have by abuſing a Nation, forfeited its affections, will never "be for truſting the people, whom they know juſtly deteſt them; but having "procured their averſion and enmity, will be fortifying themſelves againſt it, "by

expence of this army, including that of the Ordnance Office for land ſervice, is about two millions and an half, the greateſt part of which might, and ought to be ſaved to the nation. No wonder, therefore, our taxes are at the preſent tremendous height, when ſuch an immenſe ſaving might be made in only one *item* of our expenditure.

I have juſt obſerved before, "that the Mutiny Bill (which it is pretended, gives the "*only legal eſtabliſhment* to the army) paſſes "every year as a thing of courſe, for 40,000 "men;" whereas in the days of Walpole, when it was only 17,000, his demand produced a warm debate every year. He founded his pretended neceſſity for a Standing Army upon Jacobitiſm

"by all proper ways; and the ways of corruption, depredation and force, "being the only proper ones, will not fail to be practiſed: and thoſe who "practice them, will be finding reaſons to juſtify them. And becauſe they "dare not avow the true reaſons, they muſt find ſuch falſe ones, as are moſt "likely to amuſe and terrify.—Hence ſo much nonſenſe and improbability "uttered to vindicate guilty men, and *to villify an innocent people.*

"There can be but two ways in nature to govern a Nation; one is by its "own conſent, the other by force. One gains the heart, the other holds the "hands. The firſt is always choſen by thoſe who deſign to govern the people, "for the general good, the other by thoſe who deſign to oppreſs them for "their own. There is no fear of the people acting againſt their own intereſt, "when they know what it is; and when through ill conduct they become "diſſatisfied with their preſent condition, *the only effectual way to avoid the "threatening evil* is, TO REMOVE THEIR GRIEVANCES."

Cato's Letters.

cobitiſm and the fear of the Pretender. In our times, a Miniſter could not bring out the word without laughing: our Miniſters, therefore, found it upon—upon—I profeſs I do not know what they found it upon; if it be not the neceſſity of keeping down the ſpirit of the people, enraged againſt corruption and peculation, or the neceſſity of finding places in the Army, and the War Office, &c. for their tools, and the ſons of their tools.

I have been thus particular in tracing the gradual progreſs of the increaſe of the Army, and the continued and determined oppoſition of our brave and wiſe Anceſtors to it, to evince to the public, the dangerous conſequences of it to our liberties. And hitherto I have only viewed and treated it, in regard to the uſe that may be made of it, to that purpoſe, in the way of *force*; in caſe it ſhould unfortunately, ever hereafter be made uſe of in that way, as in the time of Charles I. againſt the juſt and lawful petitions and remonſtrances of an injured, yet ſuppliant people. I ſhall now beg leave to conſider it in another point of view, and to point out the dangerous conſequences of it to our liberties, in that light.

In

In my laſt, I mentioned that at the Revolution, "the death of the monſter *Prerogative* "was ſucceeded by a ſtill more dangerous enemy "to our Liberties and Conſtitution, and that this "enemy was *Influence*, the mother of *Corrup-* "*tion.*" Burnet upbraided King William to his face, "for having introduced this ſyſtem." The good Biſhop was only miſtaken in *one word*; it was *introduced* by Clifford in the reign of Charles II. and our *Glorious Deliverer*, only *improved* on it. And when improvements in evil are once begun, experience, woeful experience teaches us, they go on with rapid ſtrides. "Ill weeds are faſt in growth." The common pilferer begins at firſt, with purloining from his neighbour the value of a ſingle penny; his ſucceſs emboldens him to proceed; his unſuſpecting neighbour perceives not his loſs; he enlarges his depredations by *degrees*, till repeated ſucceſſes on his part, and careleſſneſs on that of his neighbour, encreaſes the "*amor ſæleratus habendi—the wicked deſire of having*" to ſuch a height, that he boldly graſps at his whole property, and too often at life itſelf. Much in the ſame manner have the greateſt part of the rights and privileges of the People been *filched* from them. If we attentively conſider the progreſs of the *private*, and the *public plunderer*, we ſhall find them

pretty

pretty near alike; to be ſure 'tis "*Parvis com-*
"*ponere magnis—comparing the molehill with the*
"*mountain:*" but it is an excellent criterion to judge by, for all that.

I aſſerted alſo, "that a *Standing Army* is a "ſtronger ſupport of this *Influence*, than it was "even to the monſter *Prerogative.*" Let us ſee how far authorities ſupport me in what I have advanced on this head!—I entreat your readers will keep in memory, the fact I have related of the officers at *Minorca.* If we look into the army with a ſcrutinizing eye, we ſhall find that a vaſt majority of the Officers is compoſed of the younger brothers of the *Nobility*, and the younger ſons of *wealthy Commoners* and *Borough Holders*, whoſe ariſtocratical pride is too great to ſuffer them to be contaminated by the humility of trade, or profeſſions, as they are called (except Divinity, which they can afterwards execute by *proxy*) together with all the ſons and other relatives of Mayors, Aldermen, Recorders and Returning Officers, of ſuch virtuous Boroughs, as owning no Lord but the intereſt of the *Corporators*, ſet themſelves up to ſale to the beſt bidder. Gold is not the only *bait* on theſe occaſions; intereſt with the Miniſter to obtain promotion in the Army, Navy, &c. is equally prevalent and pro-

ductive

ductive of votes; and hence, the Army will ever cling as close to the Minister, as the Right Reverend the Bench of Bishops and the sable body of the Clergy. "*Ubi eadem ratio, &c.*— "*where there is the same reason, &c.*" Or as it may be rendered, "*Wheresoever the carcase is,* "*thither the* Eagles *will be gathered together.*"

Perhaps it may be objected to what I have just said, that if our Army is commanded by the sons, and brothers, of the best families and fortunes in the kingdom, our Liberties cannot therefore be in danger from it. But, Sir, this objection is not valid: for our Liberties ought to depend upon our Constitution, and not upon the Honour of the Gentlemen of our Army. We may, perhaps, have reason to depend upon the honour of those, who are at present the Officers of our Army; but that dependence is not founded upon their being gentlemen of family, or fortune; it is founded upon their personal characters only; little regard is to be had to their being gentlemen of family and fortune; for in all countries where arbitrary power has been established, many gentlemen of the best families and fortunes have, through fear or ambition, become the tools of Ministers; and have assisted, or suffered them to sacrifice the liberties of their coun-

try. We need look no further than France, to have this fully exemplified. Let any one read that admirable work, "*Rabaud de St. Etienne's* "History of the French Revolution," and he will be thoroughly convinced of the truth, and force of the above obſervations.

Beſides, the annals of this country ſhew, that their virtue is aſſailed in ſuch a manner, that it muſt be almoſt more than is allotted to mortals, that is enabled to ſtand the repeated attacks of intereſt, all-powerful intereſt! Miniſters, in England, have made a practice of advancing or neglecting officers, according to their parliamentary conduct, and connections; and have even *diſmiſſed* them for oppoſing miniſterial meaſures. Sir Robert Walpole, in 1736, broke the Duke of Bolton and Lord Cobham, and afterwards, Mr. Pitt, for their oppoſition to him. Does not this render the Army dreadfully dangerous to Liberty?

"In all deliberations of this kind (ſays Mr. "*Pulteney* in the debate on the Spaniſh Conven- "tion, A. D. 1739) I have conſtantly obſerved "theſe military gentlemen very prudently con- "ſult the peace of their country, as well as their "own glory, by being the firſt to approve of the

" the Miniſter's moſt deſtructive ſchemes, and " even his pacific meaſures. We all know " when it has happened otherwiſe, what was the " conſequence.—They who had the courage to " follow the dictates of their own breaſts, were " diſabled from further ſerving their country in " a military capacity."

Mr. Pitt, in his ſpeech on the reduction of the Army in 1739, ſays, " We ought to ſhew " a proper gratitude to every man who has ven- " tured his life in the cauſe of his country: yet " as the law now ſtands, an old Officer who " has often ventured his life, and often ſpilled " his blood, in the ſervice of his country, may " be diſmiſſed and reduced, perhaps to a ſtarv- " ing condition, at the arbitrary will and pleaſure, " it may be, at the whim of a Miniſter; ſo that " by the preſent eſtabliſhment of the Army, the " reward of a ſoldier ſeems not to depend upon " *the ſervices done to his country*, but upon the " ſervices he does to thoſe who happen to be " Miniſters at the time. Muſt not this be al- " lowed to be a defect in the preſent eſtabliſh- " ment?" And on a motion to remove Sir Robert Walpole, in 1741, he ſaid, " Our armies " are kept up only to multiply dependence, and " to awe the nation from the exertion of its " rights."

It is needleſs to adduce any further proofs on this head; thoſe who are not ſatisfied with ſuch as I have brought forward, we may fairly ſay of them, "neither will they believe, though "one ſhould riſe from the dead."

The next aſſertion I have made is, "that "a *Standing Army* is a great and grievous ex- "pence to the nation." To prove which, I ſhall only ſtate, "Sir John Sinclair's eſtimate "of the general expences of the Peace Eſta- "bliſhment, upon the average, ſince the Revo- "tion, which is as follows:"

"During the reign of King William	- -	£. 1,907,455
Queen Anne	- -	1,965,607
George I.	- -	2,583,000
George II.	- -	2,766,000
George III. Anno 1770, including the Civil Liſt		4,322,972
Eſtimate of the Peace Eſtabliſhment in future		4,937,274."

By which it appears, that our *Peace Eſtabliſhment* has increaſed ſince the reign of King William, above *Three Millions Sterling*, *annually!* At what amount its increaſe will ſtop, our wiſe and virtuous Miniſters only know.—Far be it from me to gueſs when their *immaculate modeſty* will be aſhamed of adding to it.

The

The expences of the various wars ſince the Revolution, including the amount of the Supplies raiſed within the year, Sir John Sinclair gives as follows;

Expences of War during the reign of William III. - -	£.	30,447,382
Queen Anne - -		43,360,003
George I. - - -		6,048,267
Expence of the War begun Anno 1739		46,418,689
Ditto of the War begun Anno 1756		111,271,996
Ditto of the American War -		139,171,876
Ditto of the late Armament -		311,385
	£.	377,029,598

One obſervation I cannot avoid making here, which is,—that during the Wars of Queen Anne, in which our armies were always victorious, and our Generals crowned with glory, and covered with laurels, it appears by the foregoing eſtimate, that the whole expences amounted only to the ſum of 43,360,003l. while the American War, which laſted only ſeven years, coſt this nation the enormous ſum of 139171876l. in the courſe of which we experienced nothing but defeats and diſgrace in the *land* ſervice; had two *whole armies*, conſiſting of ſeveral thouſands each, ſhamefully taken priſoners; and loſt thirteen fertile Provinces, containing nearly as great an extent of territory as all Europe put together.

If it be aſked, why I have given this laſt eſtimate, I anſwer, to ſhew another dreadful evil, more than what I have already enumerated; for it is a notorious fact, that having a large Standing Army, has ever proved in all countries, a ſtrong ſtimulus and incentive to the Ruling Powers of the State poſſeſſing it, to go to War, that inhuman, bloody and deſtructive vortex, whoſe devouring and inſatiable maw, never knows when to be glutted with the lives and treaſure of the unfortunate and unhappy people, who are drawn or forced into it. Nothing can more clearly prove the truth of the philanthropic PAINE's aſſertion, that

"WAR is the Pharoah Table of Governments, and NATIONS "the *Dupes* of the Game."

And now, Sir, before I conclude, this letter, permit me to aſk, Where has been the neceſſity of even 5000 men as a *Standing Army* in this country, for the laſt ſeven years; or where is the neceſſity for that number in *any time of peace?*

The Dutch keep up no more than 32,000 ſtanding forces in *time of war*, though they are upon the ſame Continent with, and their Capital not many days march from the French dominions.

So

So hard have the Miniſterial Crew been put to it for arguments to defend the keeping up of a Standing Army, that we find in the Debates of the Lords, 4, 453, a pretence taken for the number of ſtanding forces kept up in *France*, for our keeping up an army proportioned to the *French*; whereas we ſhould have no more to fear from *France*'s keeping up an army of a million of men, than of one thouſand, unleſs their fleet was an overmatch for ours.

De Wit propoſed to the *French* King, during the firſt *Dutch* War, an invaſion of *England*. The King replied, that ſuch an attempt would be fruitleſs, and would unite all the *jarring parties in England* againſt the enemy. "We ſhall "have, ſays he, in a few days after our landing, "50,000 men (meaning the Militia) upon us." Our grand object, therefore, is to take care that our Fleet is ſuperior, to do which to a certainty, nothing can be ſo effectual as to procure the diſbanding of the greateſt part of the Army, and apply ſuch part of the ſavings gained thereby, as ſhall be neceſſary, to fully accompliſh the other moſt important object; which is another unanſwerable argument againſt the enormous and uſeleſs expence of a Standing Army.

And

And now, Sir, I think I have proved to the ſatisfaction of every candid and impartial mind, who has read my ſeveral letters, "that a Stand-"ing Army is dangerous to the liberties of a "*free State*, both as an object of *force* and *in-*"*fluence*; that it is a great and grievous expence "to, and burthen on the people; and that it is "by no means neceſſary, even viewing things "as they ſtood under the influence of the old "deſpotic Government of France; much leſs "now, when that great and generous Nation "has diſclaimed all Wars in future, with a view "to conqueſt, and opened their hands and "hearts to receive and embrace us as brothers." In my next, and laſt letter on the ſubject, I will conclude by proving what I have advanced reſpecting its being unconſtitutional; and that the late meaſure of building Barracks is illegal, and in the higheſt degree deſerving the reprobation and deteſtation of an abuſed, inſulted, and indignant public.

I remain, Sir,

Yours, &c.

ALBANICUS.

TO THE PRINTER.

Sir,

I Now come to the concluding part of the ſubject on the evils ariſing from a Military Eſtabliſhment, or Standing Army, in this country; and I hope the great importance of it will excite the attention of the public, for whoſe information and intereſts I have taken ſo much pains and labour on myſelf. I conſider it as a duty incumbent on every man to promote as much as in him lies, the welfare of the Community of which he is a member, and that every one who has reaſon to think, that by communicating his thoughts in print, he may thereby benefit his fellow ſubjects, in matters which might otherwiſe eſcape their knowledge, though neceſſary for them to be acquainted with, if he is able to make ſuch communication, and does not, he is neglectful of the duty he owes to Society, to ſay the leaſt of it. So much by way of excuſe. And now, Sir, to proceed.

I flatter myſelf I have already very fully and clearly ſhewn, that a Standing Army is dangerous to the Liberties of a free State, and that it is

an heavy expence and burden on the *people.* I am now to prove my other aſſertion, viz.—that it is *unconſtitutional.* And for this purpoſe, permit me to tell your readers what the learned Judge Blackſtone ſays on the ſubject.

" In a Land of Liberty" (ſays he, *Comm.* " vol. 1, p. 408) it is extremely dangerous to " make a diſtinct order of the profeſſion of " Arms. In *abſolute Monarchies*, this is neceſ- " ſary for the ſafety of the Prince, and ariſes " from the main principle of their Conſtitution, " which is that of governing by fear: but in " *free States*, the profeſſion of a Soldier, taken " ſingly, and merely as a profeſſion, is juſtly " an object of jealouſy." Here is a proof from the higheſt authority, in further corroboration of thoſe I have adduced before, as to the danger of it, and a compliment to our wiſe and cautious Anceſtors, for their ſo ſtrenuous exertions on all occaſions to oppoſe its progreſs. " The laws " therefore, (continues he) and *Conſtitution* of " theſe Kingdoms knows no ſuch ſtate as that " of a perpetual Standing Soldier, bred up to " no profeſſion but that of War." How comes it then, let me aſk, that Soldiers in this country are enliſted for life? Can any thing in this world be more *perpetual?* The preſent Army, conſiſts

of

of 40,000 men, who are all enliſted for *life*; as any of thoſe die, their places are ſupplied by others, alſo enliſted for their lives, and ſo on, *ad infinitum*. This is to all intents and purpurpoſes *perpetual*; therefore, according to Blackſtone, it is not known to the Conſtitution—in other words, it is *unconſtitutional*.

Another reaſon why it is *unconſtitutional*, in a free State, is, becauſe the men who compoſe a *Standing Army*, are ſlaves—*ſlaves for life*, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word. For what is more perfect ſlavery, than for a man to be, without relief, obliged to obey the command of another, at the hazard of his life if he obeys, and under the penalty of certain death if he diſobeys, while the ſmalleſt miſbehaviour may bring upon him the moſt painful and diſgraceful puniſhment. He is liable to be ſeverely flogged like a thief, for being ſurprized by the weakneſs of his *nature* into a temporary drunkenneſs, of which one or other of his Officers who are to be his Judges, and award his puniſhment, daily and hourly ſets him the example. It is a maxim that Arms ſhould never be entruſted into the hands of Slaves; for as Monteſquieu very juſtly obſerves, the ſenſe of their own remedileſs condition, may naturally be expected to excite in them the ſame

diſpoſition, which ſhews itſelf in the Negroes in Jamaica, and the Eunuchs in the Eaſtern Seraglios.

Again, Blackſtone ſays, p. 415, "Nothing "ought to be more guarded againſt in *a free* "*State* than making the Military Power, when "ſuch an one is *neceſſary* to be kept on foot," (which I deny that it ever is in this country *in time of peace)* "a body too diſtinct from the "people. Like ours, it ſhould be wholly com- "poſed of natural ſubjects; it ought only to "be enliſted for a ſhort and limited time." Mark Reader, it *ought only* to be enliſted for a limited time; whereas *it is* actually enliſted for life, which is evidently *unconſtitutional.* "The Sol- "diers ſhould alſo (ſays he) live intermixed "with the People; no ſeparate *Camp*, no *Bar-* "*racks*, no inland *Fortreſſes* ſhould be allowed." Yet it is notorious, that our Soldiers are enliſted for life, on pain of death if they deſert. The mere ſlavery of a Soldier's life, and the rigorous diſcipline, and *Turkiſh* ſeverities, ſo great a number of brave and free-born *Engliſh* ſubjects, are expoſed to in the Army, are ſufficient to render it the abhorrence of every true Engliſh ſpirit and the peculiar diſgrace of our country and our times.

But

But alas, poor Soldiers! and poor injured, deſpiſed, and inſulted people of England! this is not enough to gratify the Rulers of the preſent day. In defiance of the Conſtitution, and (if Blackſtone is to be believed) of the law of the land, *Barracks* are ordered to be built, and many of them are nearly finiſhed, in different parts of the kingdom. Is it poſſible that Engliſhmen can ſit tamely ſilent, and ſee the Laws and the Conſtitution thus impiouſly trodden under foot, without ſaying one word in contradiction to ſuch infamous proceedings? Or is it come to this, that you are become ſo baſely and vilely degenerate, as to think Liberty and the Conſtitution unworthy of your regard? If ſo—but I will not think it poſſible—Conſider then, before it be too late, and rouze yourſelves from the lethargy in which you ſeem plunged. You have lately exerted yourſelves in the nobleſt manner to redeem your fellow creatures in the Weſtern Hemiſphere from ſlavery; and ſhall it be ſaid that you will ſuffer yourſelves to be enſlaved? Forbid it Heaven!—The ſame legal and peaceable means are open to you which you purſued in favour of your ſuffering, ſable brethren, the unhappy Negroes, and ſurely, as *yet*, you are entitled to expect equal attention to your cauſe. Petition your Parliament to protect you againſt the unconſtitutional meaſures

ſures lately adopted, ſo adverſe and inimical to the Intreſts and Liberties of the People of this Country. You have the Law and Conſtitution to ground your petitions upon, and if they ſhall not be thought worthy of being attended to, why the ſooner you know your doom the better it will be for you. Nothing is ſo terrible as a ſtate of ſuſpence; and you had better *feel your chains at once*, than live in continual fear of the arrival of the moment when your imperious and deſpotic Rulers ſhall think proper to throw off the maſk, and to rivet them round your necks.

In my opinion, the neceſſity of oppoſing this daring attempt againſt your Liberties and and Conſtitution, ſuperſedes, and ought to take place of every other lighter matter; and, much as it is wanting, even a Reform in Parliament ſhould give way, till this point is ſettled. When the late Proclamation firſt made its appearance, I clearly foreſaw it was only the harbinger to ſome more important and ſwelling miſchief.—(What is a Comet without its fiery Tail?) In that we ſaw the freedom of communicating our thoughts aſſailed; and the reſpectable characters of Juſtices of the Peace converted into Informers, and degraded into Spies. In the preſent meaſure we ſee the Soldiers, who we are told by

Blackſtone,

Blackſtone, "ſhould live intermixed with the "people," ſeparated from them, to be immured and ſhut up in thoſe *military Baſtiles*, called *Barracks*, which the ſame learned authority aſſures us, is not to be endured.

What can be the reaſon, let me aſk, that when we are groaning already under the weight of taxes, and that our Military Eſtabliſhment at this time coſts us Two Millions and an Half annually, that the Nation ſhould be ſaddled with the addition of ſuch a profligate expenditure of the Public Money, as the ground and building of theſe ſeveral Barracks will amount to? We are in profound peace with all the world, and our ancient and ſtrongeſt enemy, France, is now moſt deſirous of becoming our beſt, and moſt intimate friend. It is evident, therefore, this is a dark and daring attempt againſt our own liberties; that it is intended to eſtrange the minds of the Soldiers from the intereſts of the people; and by keeping them together as a diſtinct claſs of men, to endeavour to weaken their affections, and to make them forget they are citizens. This ſecluſion from the world will alſo keep them in ignorance of what paſſes in it; and perhaps it may be hoped and expected, by the virtuous adviſers of this meaſure, that their minds and tem-

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pers may be ſoured thereby, and rendered ſo far ferocious, that they will implicitly obey any command that ſhall be laid upon them; ſo that ſhould the unhappy multitude, remembering they once were free, preſume to murmur at their degrading change, brought on them by their ſupineneſs and criminal neglect, and dare to demand their rights thus traitorouſly wreſted from them, it will only be neceſſary to proclaim Martial Law, inſtead of reading the Riot Act, and theſe cooped up Machines of Deſpotic Vengeance may be expected to "ſheath their ſwords "in every breaſt they meet." Such was the expectation of the ariſtocratical Tyrants of France on the very eve of the late Revolution; but in France, the Soldiers were always enliſted for ſhort terms, and were continually returning into the claſs of citizens; this ſaved the country, and gave them freedom from deſpotic chains. Our Soldiers are enliſted for life, and may be made the engines to enſlave their country,—if that is not effectually done already.

Let not any one ſay, theſe are vain fears. Let us look back only a few years; the time of General Warrants, and the Middleſex Election, are proofs to the contrary. In the latter affair, Lord Chatham in the Houſe of Lords, Feb. 2,

1770,

1770, in his ſpeech on that buſineſs, aſſerted, "that the vote of the Houſe of Commons which "made Colonel Lutterel the Repreſentative for "Middleſex, in excluſion of Mr. Wilkes, was "a groſs invaſion of the rights of election, a "dangerous violation of the Engliſh Conſtitu-"tion, a treacherous ſurrender of the invaluable "privilege of a Freehold, and a corrupt ſacri-"fice of their own Honour. That to gratify "the reſentment of ſome individuals, the laws "had been deſpiſed, trampled upon and de-"ſtroyed. Theſe meaſures, he ſaid, made a "part of the unhappy ſyſtem which had been "formed in the preſent reign with a view to "new-model the Conſtitution, as well as the "Government. The Commons ſlaviſhly obey-"the commands of his Majeſty's ſervants, and "thereby exhibited and proved to the conviction "of every man, what might have been only "mattet of ſuſpicion before,—that *Miniſters held* "*a corrupt influence in Parliament*;—it was de-"monſtrable, it was indiſputable." The Nation, at this period, thinking as his Lordſhip did, was all in a ferment; petitions were ſent from every corner of the kingdom, deſiring the King to diſſolve the Parliament; the ſubſequent impriſonment of Mr. Wilkes occaſioned very numerous meetings in St. George's Fields; the

Army was drawn out by the *gentle* Weymouth, as he was called by Junius; and young Mr. Allen, the ſon of an eminent brewer, being among the crowd out of curioſity, was purſued by three Soldiers and an Officer, ſome hundred yards, and infamouſly bayonetted in cool blood in a cow-houſe. One Miniſter reſigned after another, till it ſeemed as if in the end, the helm would be entirely deſerted: yet ſay the Anecdotes of Lord Chatham, lately publiſhed, "All "this had no effect upon the Court;" notwithſtanding the loud clamours of the Nation, "the "reſolution of the private or confidential Cabi-"net was ſtill to *perſevere*; to rely upon the "power of the Crown; and if this was not ſuf-"ficient, *to depend upon the Army.*"—Impious determination! But even then, they had never dared to think of erecting Barracks, audacious as they were in their attacks on the Conſtitution. I fear the determination above alluded to, is about to be revived with increaſed inſolence and audacity. Britons be watchful.

When Cæſar, by every wicked art, procured the Government of *Illyricum* for five years, with an army of four legions, (not half the ſtanding force now kept up by our Miniſters) *Cato* told the Senators what they afterwards ſeverely felt, that

that they were placing an armed Tyrant in their Citadel.

" Even the Penſion Parliament, in Charles " the Second's time (ſays Mr. Gordon) and " James's firſt paſſive obedience Parliament, " ſtopped ſhort, and turned upon thoſe corrupt " Miniſters, when the laſt ſtroke was levelled " againſt Liberty. They ſaw that when they " ſhould be no longer neceſſary, they would be " uſed as Traitors always are, by thoſe who " take advantage of their treaſon, that is, ſacri- " ficed to the reſentment of the people."

I fervently pray that future Parliaments may purſue the ſame ſteps when they come to the ſame criſis, in whatever age it may be; but the people ought not to wait for ſuch an event. I warn them to be upon their guard, and to take for their motto "*Principiis obſta*"—*Stop an evil in its beginning*. Delays are dangerous: the chains of ſlavery are more eaſily faſtened on, than they are got rid of. I am afraid that on a cloſe examination we ſhall find that we are already more than half bound, and if we fooliſhly continue in our preſent ſtate of torpid apathy, all efforts to extricate ourſelves will be in vain. My heart bleeds while I contemplate our ſituation; but I

can truly affirm, that it is not ſwayed by one particle of ſelfiſh fear. But, Sir, that you and your readers, my fellow citizens and countrymen, may not ſuppoſe I am merely a croaker, and that the ſentiments I breathe are dictated by an untimely timidity, in addition to what is ſaid by Blackſtone, that no Barracks ought to be ſuffered, I beg leave to quote the further authority of a *noble*, *honeſt* and *independent* ſenator upon the ſame ſubject:

"There is one thing (ſays Lord Gage, Deb. "Com. 11. 388) *fatal above all others*, that "muſt be the conſequence of ſo great a body of "troops being kept on foot in England, and will "be the *finiſhing ſtroke to all our liberties*. As "the towns in England will not be able much "longer to contain quarters for them, moſt of "thoſe who keep public houſes being nearly ru-"ined by ſoldiers billetted on them; ſo on the "pretence of the neceſſity of it, Barracks will be "built for quartering them, which will be as ſo "many fortreſſes with ſtrong garriſons in them, "erected in all parts of England, which can tend "to nothing but by degrees to ſubdue and en-"ſlave the kingdom. But if ever this ſhould "be attempted, it will be incumbent on every "*Engliſhman* to endeavour to prevent it by all "methods;

" methods ; and as it would be *the laſt ſtand that*
" *could ever be made for our liberties*, rather than
" ſuffer it to be put in execution, it would be
" our duty *to draw our ſwords*, and never put
" them up till our liberties were ſecured, and
" *the authors of our intended Slavery brought*
" *to condign puniſhment*."

Thus, Sir, I have candidly and faithfully ſtated my ſeveral reaſons and authorities, in proof of the aſſertions I firſt ſet out with, viz. " That " a STANDING ARMY is dangerous to the liber- " ties of a *free ſtate* ; that it is *unconſtitutional* in " this country ; that it is an enormous and grie- " vous *burden on the people* ; that the meaſure of " building BARRACKS in many parts of the " kingdom is *unconſtitutional* and *illegal*, and the " adviſers of it deſerving of exemplary puniſh- " ment." In doing which, I moſt ſolemnly declare, I am actuated by no ſiniſter or party motives ; nor have I the ſmalleſt inducement to take ſo much trouble, but a ſincere love for my country, and an ardent deſire to promote her intereſts. To the awful tribunal of the public I ſubmit my facts, and the reaſoning and deductions I have drawn from them. If I have erred in any thing it is not intentionally. If I fail of making a due impreſſion by what I have written, it is for want

of

of ability to paint ſuch important facts in their true colours. I have often wiſhed, during the writing of theſe Letters, that I could procure the hand of an angel to guide my pen, that my words might be inſpired with ſeraphic influence, and darting like electric fire into the boſoms of my countrymen, might carry conviction into every mind, open the eyes of the deluded people of this once-favoured nation, and cauſe them to behold the difficulties and dangers which now ſurround us. With ſuch an aſſiſtance, I might have entertained the warmeſt hope that our Country and our Liberties might yet be ſaved. I fear we are too far ſunk from the pre-eminence we once could proudly boaſt, for any mortal perſuaſion to do us good. In all events, I have exerted my feeble efforts in the cauſe of Freedom and my Country; and let circumſtances in future turn out as they may, I ſhall have the conſolation to reflect, that my fellow citizens can never hereafter upbraid or reproach me with the crime of not warning them to preſerve their Liberty and their Virtue.

ALBANICUS.

POST-

POSTCRIPT.

IN arbitrary Monarchies, where the Deſpot who reigns can ſay to his wretched ſubjects, "Eat ſtraw, and they eat ſtraw," accordingly, no wonder that they can raiſe Armies of human Butchers, to deſtroy their fellow creatures; but in a country like Great-Britain, which at leaſt is *pretended to be free*, it becomes a matter of no ſmall ſurprize that ſo many thouſands of men ſhould deliberately renounce the privileges and bleſſings attendant on Freemen, and voluntarily ſell themſelves to the moſt humiliating and degrading *Slavery*, for the miſerable pittance of Sixpence a day, and the pitiful pride of ſtrutting about in the mock trumpery and finery of a Soldier's Habiliments.

That Soldiers *are Slaves*, muſt be apparent to every the moſt common underſtanding; for what is Slavery, but to have no Will of one's own; but to be ſubject during life to the command of certain people placed over us, for the very purpoſe. Do they not renounce their right

to

to a Trial by Jury, and ſubject themſelves to the harſh and rigorous rules of a Court Martial, where their Judges are not their equals, but their ſuperiors; and obliged to decide with unremitting ſeverity, and puniſh with rigour in order to their own ſafety.

The excellence of the juriſprudence of the Civil Power, which they have thus bartered away, conſiſts in the equality of its diſtribution of juſtice to every one who is ſubject to its laws; the very eſſence of the Military Juriſdiction which they have adopted in its ſtead, conſiſts of the exact reverſe. A ſhort inſtance will prove this beyond a doubt. Their Officers, who are their Judges in all caſes of trial, they very frequently ſee in a ſtate of intoxication, with impunity; if an Officer ſees a Soldier in ſuch a ſtate, his duty obliges him to call him to an account. For the firſt offence he is, perhaps, ſent to the *black-hole*; for the ſecond, a longer confinement in the ſame place; and for every other, the common puniſhment of a *Negro Slave* in the Weſt-Indies, conſiſting of a flogging on the bare back, of any number of laſhes, from *one hundred* to *one thouſand*; and this to be repeated as often as the weakneſs of human nature, or the ſtrength of human propenſities, ſhall ſtimulate him

him to follow the example of thoſe who are his ſuperiors, his commanders, and his *judges:* and who continually paſs ſentence on him for the commiſſion of thoſe very crimes, of which they almoſt every day appear before his eyes the invariable perpetrators, only to a much greater exceſs.

If the ſpirit of the man predominates ſo far as to murmur at the injuſtice, as he thinks it, of his ſentence, his flogging is encreaſed: if nature farther revolts at it, and he deſerts, he is ſometimes *ſhot*; but if his judges happen to be inclined to *mercy*, his ſentence is tenderly mitigated to a flogging, which every other man *but a ſoldier* would think infinitely *worſe than death.*

Notwithſtanding all theſe dreadful diſadvantages, we ſee that forty thouſand of thoſe *ſlaves* in *red coats* are kept on foot at the enormous expence to the public of *two millions and an half*, when not a third part of the number, nay not even one, if the matter was honeſtly ſifted to the bottom, is really neceſſary.

The foregoing letters will, I flatter myſelf, ſufficiently ſhew the danger of keeping up ſuch a formidable army of mercenaries; the only aim

 therefore,

therefore, of this Poſtcript, is to give a few additional remarks on the many diſadvantages reſulting to the Nation by the perpetual entailment of the expence of ſuch an unneceſſary body of men on the public purſe; and by which the Community ſuffers in many other reſpects.

Our Courtiers affect to call the *Britiſh* Land Eſtabliſhment, a Parliamentary Army, and would deceive us into a notion of a difference between a Standing Army and a Parliamentary one. The Britiſh Land Forces, ſay they, are appointed from year to year, not only as to their number but their ſubſiſtence; ſo that the Parliament's neglecting to provide for their ſubſiſtence, would be annihilating the army at once. I have already ſhewn the fallacy of this argument. But I will now aſk further, Can any one ſay, with truth, that the Army is leſs a grievance for its being on this foot, than if it were on the ſame with thoſe of *Pruſſia* or *Heſſe Caſſel*, or any other *Deſpotic Prince*?

Suppoſe, that for twenty years together we ſhould have no Parliament called; at the end of that period, could the grievance and loſs to the Nation be eſtimated as at all leſs, upon the whole, than it would have been if the King had, at the beginning

beginning of the twenty years, declared by edict, that there ſhould be no Parliament during that period? This would be a bolder ſtroke of Tyranny, than merely neglecting, from year to year, or refuſing to let the writs be iſſued; but the People would be as really deprived of the advantages of Parliaments by one proceeding, as by the other.

I have ſaid, in the preceding Letters, that a Standing Army, beſides being dangerous to the Liberties of the Country, and an abominable burden to it, is alſo unneceſſary, and I now repeat it. A formidable *Navy*, and a *Militia on a proper footing*, would render this Iſland perfectly inacceſſible to a Foreign Enemy.

The *Grecians* carried on their wars againſt *Perſia*, by means of their Militia, and at laſt beat the numerous mercenary Armies, and ſubdued the vaſt Empire of *Perſia*. The *Romans* carried on their wars againſt *Carthage*, and deſtroyed that rich and populous city. But when the *Romans*, in order to ſupport *the arbitrary power of their Emperors*, began to put their whole truſt in *mercenary Armies*, their military glory ſoon began to decline; and at laſt the *Goths* and *Vandals*, and other Northern Nations, *by means of their Militia*,

Militia, drove before them the mercenary Armies of *Rome*, and made that proud city ſubmit to the yoke which ſhe had, in former times, by *the ſame means*, put upon a great part of the world.

" The Conſtitution of Rome was founded " upon this principle (ſays Monteſquieu, v. 1. " p. 287) that thoſe only ſhould be ſoldiers, who " had property to anſwer to the Republic for " their conduct. The Equeſtrians, as being the " richeſt, formed the Cavalry of the Legions. " When their dignity was increaſed, they would " not ſerve any longer ; ſo that it was neceſſary " to raiſe another Cavalry. Marcus took into " his Legions all ſorts of people. The *Romans* " were undone."

In our own Country, in former times, there was no mercenary Army. It was the Militia which went to the Holy Wars—that conquered France at *Agincourt*, at *Creſſy*, and *Poictiers*.

" No Kingdom (ſays the admirable Fletcher " of Scotland, p. 307) can be ſecured otherwiſe " than by arming the People. The poſſeſſion of " arms is the diſtinction between a Freeman and " a Slave. He who has nothing, and who him- " ſelf belongs to another, muſt be defended by

" him

" him whoſe property he is, and needs no arms.
" But he who thinks he is his own Maſter, and
" has what he can call his own, ought to have
" arms to defend himſelf, and what he poſſeſſes;
" elſe he lives precariouſly and at diſcretion. And
" though for awhile thoſe who have the ſword
" in their power abſtain from doing him injury,
" yet, by degrees, he will be awed into ſubmiſ-
" ſion to every arbitrary command. Our an-
" ceſtors (the *Caledonii*, ſee *Tacit.* &c.) by be-
" ing always armed, and frequently in action,
" defended themſelves againſt the *Romans*, *Danes*
" and *Engliſh*, and maintained their liberty againſt
" the incroachments of their own Princes."

Nothing will ever make a Nation ſo unconquerable as a Militia, or every man's being trained to arms. For every *Briton* having in him by birth the principal part of a ſoldier, I mean the *heart*, will want but little training, beyond what he will have as a Militia-Man, to make him a complete ſoldier. A Standing Army, though numerous, might be routed in one engagement, if an engagement ſhould happen in caſe of a Foreign Invaſion. This has once been the caſe. At the Battle of Haſtings, this Country became ſubjected to the Deſpot William the firſt, a Baſtard of Normandy, under whoſe tyranny, and his

Son's

Son's, the miſerable People too long groaned. Whereas the Militia of Britain would be a million of men, which would render a deſcent from any Enemy, an operation of war not to be thought of.

" The eſſential quality of a Militia (ſays the " ſame Mr. Fletcher, p. 31, 42, 54.) conſiſtent " with Freedom, is, That the Officers be " named and preferred, and they and the ſoldiers " maintained, not by the Prince, but the People " who ſend them out. Ambitious Princes" (and he would have added, had he foreknown the late *Duke of Newcaſtle's* oppoſition to the eſtabliſhment of the Militia—*corrupt Miniſters*) " have always endeavoured to diſcredit the Mili- " tia, and render it burdenſome to the People, " by never ſuffering it to be upon any right, or " even tolerable footing, all to perſuade the ne- " ceſſity of Standing Forces. In the Battle of " *Naſeby*, the number of forces was equal on " both ſides, and all circumſtances equal. In " the Parliament's Army only nine Officers had " ever ſeen actual ſervice, and moſt of the ſol- " diers were London 'Prentices, drawn out of " the city two months before. In the King's " Army there were above 1,000 Officers who " had ſerved abroad, yet the regulars were routed " by the 'Prentices. A good Militia is of ſuch

" importance

" importance to a Nation, that it is the chief part
" of the Conſtitution of every free Government.
" For, though as to other things, the Conſtitu-
" tion be ever ſo ſlight or imperfect, a good Mi-
" litia will always preſerve the public Liberty;
" and in the beſt Conſtitution ever known, as to
" all other parts of Government, if the Militia
" be not upon a right foot, the Liberty of the
" People muſt be in great danger. The Militia
" of ancient Rome made her Miſtreſs of the
" World. *Standing Armies* enſlaved her. The
" *Lacedemonians* continued 800 years free, be-
" cauſe they had a good Militia. The Swiſs are
" the freeſt people in our times, and like to con-
" tinue ſo the longeſt, becauſe they have the beſt
" Militia."

However a corrupt Government may intend to defeat the deſign of a Militia, by totally perverting it from its original intention and uſe, this ought not to hinder all men of property from learning the uſe of arms. There is no law againſt a free ſubject's acquiring any laudable accompliſhment. And if the generality of houſekeepers were only half diſciplined, a deſigning Prince, or Miniſtry, would hardly dare to provoke the People by an open attack on their Liberties, leſt they ſhould find means to be completely inſtructed

ſtructed in the exerciſe of arms before the chain could be rivetted. But without the People's having ſome knowledge of arms, I ſee not what is to ſecure them againſt Slavery, whenever it ſhall pleaſe a daring Prince or Miniſtry to reſolve on making their experiment. See the Hiſtories of all the Nations of the World.

The Militia Act is long and intricate; whereas there was nothing neceſſary but to direct that every third man in every pariſh in England, whoſe houſe had ten or more windows, ſhould be exerciſed in his own pariſh, by an experienced Sergeant, a certain number of times in every year, the days to be appointed; and every third part of every pariſh to be upon the liſt for three years, and free ſix years; ſo that in nine years, every ſuch houſekeeper in England might have all the knowledge he could acquire by field days. The men never to be drawn out of their reſpective pariſhes, but to reſiſt an Invaſion, quell an Inſurrection, or ſome neceſſary purpoſe. Every healthy houſekeeper of the above deſcription, under fifty years of age, who refuſed to enliſt and attend the exerciſing days, to be fined. No hirelings to be accepted. The Commanders to be men of the largeſt property in each county.

A country, in which every man of property might defend his property,* could have no occaſion for a dangerous Standing Army, and would be incomparably more ſecure againſt invaſion, than it could be with a Standing Army of 50,000 men, ſcattered over a whole kingdom and its dependencies.

Brigadier General Townſend, in his dedication of the "*Plan of Diſcipline for the Militia* "*of the County of Norfolk*, affirms, that he has

 "made

* When we ſee, as in all the Monarchies in Europe, the Government only armed, *Deſpotiſm* is eſtabliſhed. When thoſe who have property, alone are armed, how ſecure the people from oppreſſion? When thoſe who have *no property* are armed, how prevent their ſeizing the property of others? Perhaps the beſt method of guarding againſt theſe contrary evils, is to embody in a national Militia, all *who have property*. Such a force in this Iſland would probably amount to above 100,000 men, and would be amply ſufficient for repreſſing all thoſe riots, the object of which might be immediately, or ultimately, the democratic miſchief of transferring property.

The late riots at Birmingham ought to convince every man, who looks to the preſervation of the peace, that a Militia of Property is abſolutely neceſſary; had it exiſted at that town, no ſuch infamous tranſactions could have taken place, to the diſgrace of the age and nation. Thoſe riots may convince us how *inſecure our property really is* in England, and how very imperfect that POLITICAL SYSTEM, which could twice in ten years ſee two of the greateſt towns in England at the mercy of a vile mob. The military muſt, in relation to the greateſt part of the kingdom, be always at a diſtance; but a Militia is on the ſpot, and eaſy to be collected, by previous regulations, at a moment's warning.—*Vide Travels through France, by the ingenious and indefatigable A. Young, Eſq. p.* 551—a work which reflects the greateſt luſtre upon the author, and which ought to be carefully peruſed by every man who wiſhes to be properly informed of the "Commerce, Wealth, Reſources, &c. of France."

" made ſome perſons maſters of that exerciſe in " two or three mornings, ſo as to perform it " with grace and ſpirit; and that the common " men learned it in ſeven or eight days time, " ſome in leſs."

The ſame gentleman complains heavily of the " diſcouragements, ſlights, delays, evaſions, " and unnatural treatment" of the Militia-act, from thoſe whoſe duty it was to ſee it executed according to its intention. One would think the old Militia law might have directed our Government to avoid ſending the Militia out of their reſpective counties. This was always expreſſly guarded againſt, and was never to be done, but in the caſe of foreign invaſion. *See Lord Lyttleton's Hiſt. of Hen. II. Vol. 3, p. 318.*

Here I ſhall reſt this part of the ſubject, under this impreſſion, that enough has been ſaid to ſatisfy thoſe who are open to conviction; and if any of theſe would wiſh to ſearch deeper into the matter, I beg leave to refer them to Mr. Gordon's tracts, Mr. Trenchard's Hiſt. of Standing Armies, the works of Fletcher (of Scotland) and Montague's excellent Reflections on the Riſe and Fall of ancient Republics.

I ſhall now proceed to the concluſion of this Poſtcript, with a few obſervations on the diſadvantages accruing to this country, by keeping up ſuch a numerous Standing Army, in two points of view; firſt, on the ſcore of morality, and ſecondly, on the loſs which it ſuſtains by being deprived of the labour of ſo many thouſand men in the prime and vigour of life.

And firſt as to the *moral evil* ariſing from ſuch an inſtitution.* When we reflect on the circumſtances of 40,000 men, in the prime of life, in a manner prevented from entering into the marriage ſtate and all the gratifications of domeſtic ſociety, it is almoſt impoſſible not to ſee the long train of ills which neceſſarily follow. Doomed by their ſituation to a ſtate of celibacy, though they have voluntarily given up the eſſential rights of *freemen*, yet it is not in their power to diveſt themſelves of the feelings and paſſions of mere *men*; "Nature will prevail."—It is not from

 the

* It is notorious that the common converſation of ſoldiers is little elſe than a mixture of obſcenity and prophaneneſs, inſomuch that *to ſwear like a Trooper* is become a common proverb. Soldiers, therefore, are conſidered as more peculiarly addicted to this infamous cuſtom than moſt other men. Now, when it is recollected that they paſs the greateſt part of their time in public houſes, which are places of common reſort both for the tranſacting of buſineſs, and for the holding of convivial meetings, by the gay the young, and the thoughtleſs, can it be doubted but the contagion muſt ſpread, till the mechanic, the ſervant, or the apprentice, rivals the ſoldier in debauchery and prophaneneſs.

the *ſoldier* that we can expect the impetus of Paſſion to be ſubjected to the controul of Reaſon; and thus we ſee them expoſed, and in a great degree driven to gratify the inſtincts of nature at the expence of innocence and virtue. In towns where they are quartered for any length of time, how many parents and maſters of families experience the moſt affecting, and even afflicting inconveniences? while the poor, unhappy objects of ſeduction, become too often miſerable for life; condemned by one falſe and fatal error to linger out a wretched exiſtence, ſubject to the continual reproaches and gnawings of their own conſcience; pointed at by the finger of Scorn, as objects of Infamy; and compelled, as it were, for a precarious and wretched ſubſiſtence, to fill the ſtreets; to wound the boſoms of ſenſibility and humanity, and to ſhock the feelings of the Chriſtian, when he ſees them daily and hourly adding to the liſt, and ſwelling the already overflowing channels of abandoned proſtitution, which is, at the ſame time, one of the greateſt misfortunes and diſgraces to this country.

Nor are the dreadful conſequences reſulting to the miſerable females above deſcribed, either all or the worſt of the miſchiefs which attend this

this illicit commerce of the ſexes. In addition to what has been already ſaid, after bewailing the numerous melancholy inſtances in which the grey hairs of humble, but honeſt poverty, are hurried by ſhame and ſorrow to the grave, there is this further evil to be noticed. By the law of the land the mother *muſt* fix upon a father to the child, or otherwiſe ſhe is bound to *maintain* it herſelf; and beſides this, to give ſecurity that it ſhall not become chargeable to the pariſh. The firſt and greateſt miſchief and crime which is attendant on this, in my opinion, impolitic law, is, I fear, the temptation to, and the cauſe of the great number of murders of baſtard children which are committed in this country; the ſecond is, the crime of perjury,* which they are alſo

* Some years ago, in the city of Bath, a young girl who was a notorious common proſtitute, happened to be with child, and being taken before one of the Aldermen of that Corporation, was told by that ſapient magiſtrate that ſhe muſt declare on oath, who was the father, in order that he might be made to indemnify the pariſh. N. B. The poor girl, with a degree of honour and honeſty not to be expected from her unhappy ſituation and profeſſion, anſwered that ſhe could not pretend to ſay who was the father, for that her connexions had been ſo various and indiſcriminate that, without perjuring herſelf, it was impoſſible ſhe could ſwear it to any *one* perſon by name. The magiſtrate told her ſhe *muſt* ſwear it poſitively to *ſome one*; ſhe ſtill argued her *conſcience*, till the *Diſpenſer of Juſtice* waxing exceeding wroth, ordered the clerk to make out her *mittimus*, and he would ſend her to jail. While the clerk was engaged in this pious taſk, and before it was finiſhed, the girl ſaid, ſhe *would* ſwear the child.—Oh, ho, will you ſo, ſays the Juſtice? I thought we ſhould bring you to!—Give her the book. Which being done, and the oath adminiſtered in due form, the Juſtice ordered her to name

alſo tempted to thereby: for inſtance, a girl is with child by a ſoldier, he is not liable to provide for the child; a father who *is liable* muſt then be found, or the mother muſt find ſecurity, &c. this ſhe is not able to do; and to ſave herſelf from impriſonment, ſhe ſwears the child which ſhe knows to be the ſoldier's, to any other man againſt whom ſhe has a pique; or who ſhe thinks may be able to ſupport it.* Here by

name the father, when ſhe very calmly, but firmly replied, *You are the father*, Mr. ALDERMAN.—Neither threats nor perſuaſions could ever move her from this; the Alderman was obliged to indemnify the pariſh and maintain the child; and what is very remarkable, the ſame girl had ſeven or eight children afterwards, but was never aſked to ſwear the father of any of them but the firſt.

* *A fact of this kind is within the author's own knowledge.* A very few years ago a gentleman, a very intimate friend of his, was waited on by the Overſeers of the Pariſh, who informed him that a certain young woman in the neighbourhood was with child, and had ſworn that he was the father. He aſſured them he did not even know the girl, but no matter for that, *ſhe had ſworn.* The gentleman ſent for his Attorney, who paſſed his word to the Overſeers, that as ſoon as the girl was delivered, he would, whenever called on for the purpoſe, give ſecurity to the pariſh. Between this time and the *accouchement*, the girl was taken very ill, and expected to die; and to eaſe her conſcience, ſhe declared before ſeveral witneſſes, that ſhe had *perjured* herſelf; that the father of the child was *a ſoldier* who had left the town with his regiment ſome time before; and that ſhe ſwore it to that gentleman, whom ſhe confeſſed ſhe knew only by name, becauſe ſhe had heard he was a very good man, and ſhe thought he would (as he was very able to do) provide for it, as ſhe found ſhe muſt ſwear it to ſome one, or go to jail. The gentleman was informed of theſe particulars, and adviſed to traverſe the matter: but on enquiring into the expence, he found that to do ſo would coſt him 30l. that he muſt ruin the girl by proving her perjured, and perhaps be required alſo to proſecute her for the crime; he made, therefore, a virtue of neceſſity, gave ſecurity to the pariſh, and the Magiſtrates made

by the crime of perjury ſhe extricates herſelf from the dread of the law, and procures a maintenance, as it is called, for the infant: but mark the conſequences to the poor fellow who is thus called upon by the law to maintain a child that does not belong to him. He is unable, perhaps, to find the ſecurity required; he flies from the place, and is no ſooner ſettled in another, and endeavouring by honeſt induſtry to gain a livelihood, than he is purſued by the overſeers of the pariſh he fled from; he flies again, and they purſue as often as they get intelligence where he is; and thus his life is rendered miſerable, his ſubſiſtence precarious, for a ſuppoſed crime which he never committed, and the public money is ſquandered away in vain and idle purſuits, frequently in a proportion after one man, that would maintain three children during the time preſcribed by the law.

I now proceed to the ſecond part of my obſervations, which, though very important the conſequences, will be very ſhort; and which are

made an order for him to pay Eighteen-pence a week towards the maintenance of the child. Thus the intrigue of this ſoldier cauſed a poor creature to perjure herſelf, and a worthy character to be ſaddled with a certain expence for ſeveral years, to ſupport a child, of which he was no more the father than the man in the moon. England has long been famed for the *wiſdom* and *juſtice* of its laws.—Surely this law can never be adduced in favour of either!

are intended to ſhew "the loſs which the na-
"tion ſuſtains by being deprived of the labour
"of ſo many thouſand men." The immortal Locke, in his admirable treatiſe on Civil Government, p. 208, clearly ſhews, "that num-
"bers of men are to be preferred to largeneſs of
"dominions; and that the increaſe of lands and
"the right employing of them, is the great art
"of Government; and that Prince (ſays he)
"who ſhall be ſo wiſe and godlike, as by eſta-
"bliſhed laws of liberty to ſecure protection and
"encouragement to the honeſt induſtry of man-
"kind, againſt the oppreſſion of power and nar-
"rowneſs of party, will quickly be too hard for
"his neighbours."

Here again is a ſtriking inſtance that a numerous Standing Army muſt be of the greateſt prejudice, by the difference which is derived to population from the natural increaſe and produce to it of forty thouſand men, in the prime and vigour of life, bred to a ſober and induſtrious calling, entering into matrimony, and enriching the country by their legal and robuſt progeny; and the great decreaſe which muſt be the conſequence of ſo many thouſands living a life of celibacy, and the unhealthy and ricketty produce (infinitely ſhort as it muſt be in numbers) which comes

comes from the indiſcriminate and illicit commerce of the ſexes, and from men of a looſe, diſorderly, and debauched courſe of life.

The loſs of their labour will be made apparent in a few words. The great nurſeries, or hotbeds for recruiting the Army, are the populous manufacturing towns. Was I to eſtimate their labour as manufacturers, the amount would be very large indeed. I will, therefore, only take it at the average price of common labour, and fix that at eighteen pence a day which, I believe is a very fair eſtimate, and at this rate the loſs of the labour of forty thouſand men * will amount annually to the ſum of *one million two hundred thouſand pounds.* This ſum, if added to the *two millions and an half*, which I have before ſhewn is the preſent charge of our military eſtabliſh-

M ment,

* In the courſe of laſt ſummer, labourers were ſo ſcarce in many parts of the country, that it was with great difficulty the harveſt could be got in. We have hitherto depended very much in the caſes of the hay and corn harveſts, on the aſſiſtance afforded us by the number of lower claſſes of the Iriſh; but the aſtoniſhing emigrations which have taken place in that country, for America, has almoſt totally deprived us of that reſource, and if they obtain the reform in parliament which they ſeem on the point of doing, we may bid adieu to their aſſiſtance in our harveſts for ever; for they will have enough o work then in their own delightful and luxuriant iſland. And, perhaps, if we advert to the preſent univerſal rage for inland navigations called *canals*, i may be found neceſſary to look out for ſome country from whence to impor labourers for carrying ſuch mighty projects into execution: otherwiſe th harveſt will either hurt the progreſs of canals, or the latter (which Heave avert) injure the getting in the harveſt.

ment, makes the ſum of *three millions ſeven hundred thouſand pounds per annum*, which I think I have fairly ſhewn may all be ſaved to this country,—*in time of peace*. This ſaving is, in my humble opinion, worthy the attention of every thinking, every honeſt man: and to the ſerious and attentive conſideration of ſuch, I beg leave to ſubmit the foregoing Letters, and this Poſtcript; and though I ſhould never derive any further ſatisfaction for the trouble I have taken, than to be reproached by the *time-ſerving* tools of the day, with the epithets *factious* and *ſeditious*, which are now indiſcriminately applied to all honeſt enquiries into the principles of men and meaſures; wrapped in the mantle of my own integrity, I ſhall deſpiſe their aſperſions, and conſole myſelf with the reflection that I have done my *duty to my country* as far as I am able, and *that* I conſider, in a ſecondary degree *only* to MY DUTY TO GOD.

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FINIS.